University of Florida Levin College of Law

UF Law Scholarship Repository
UF Law Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

2022

The Long-Term Effects of Short Selling and Negative Activism
Peter Molk
University of Florida Levin College of Law, pmolk@law.ufl.edu

Frank Partnoy

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub
Part of the Securities Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Peter Molk & Frank Partnoy, The Long-Term Effects of Short Selling and Negative Activism, 2022 U. Ill. L.
Rev. 1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at UF Law Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in UF Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UF
Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

PARTNOY & MOLK .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1/31/22 10:29 PM

THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF SHORT
SELLING AND NEGATIVE ACTIVISM
Peter Molk*
Frank Partnoy**
We investigate the long-term effects of short selling and “negative activism,” where activists seek to profit from declines in the share prices of
targeted firms. We show that negative activism is associated with significant and declining long-term share returns and operating performance, as
well as an increase in securities litigation and regulatory actions against
targeted firms. We explore the policy implications of this new evidence, including ways that policy makers and market participants might take advantage of the potential benefits of short selling negative activism. Our message is straightforward: resist impulses to curb short selling, and instead
embrace attempts to harness the information generated by negative activists.
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INTRODUCTION

During early 2021, the financial markets were shaken by an epic multibillion dollar battle between a loosely organized group of stock traders communicating through the discussion website Reddit and several large hedge funds who
had bet against companies they asserted were overvalued.1 The populist-oriented
individual traders purchased shares of GameStop, AMC, BlackBerry, and other
companies in tandem, driving the share prices of those companies up by hundreds
of percent in just a few days.2 These traders made fortunes as large as those that
the hedge funds lost: billions of dollars in aggregate.3
The controversy centered around the phenomena of short selling and “negative activism,” topics we have covered in depth in prior research.4 News about
the rapid gains and losses immediately raised a range of fundamental regulatory
and policy questions as Robinhood and other online trading platforms temporarily restricted trading in targeted companies.5 Litigation ensued, as did calls for
reforming short selling,6 with members of Congress vilifying short sellers.7
1. Matt Phillips & Taylor Lorenz, “Dumb Money” Is on GameStop, and It’s Beating Wall Street at Its
Own Game, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/27/business/gamestop-wall-streetbets.html [https://perma.cc/R6KS-XYL2].
2. See id.
3. Id. (noting a 1,700% increase in GameStop’s stock price in December, and a $10 billion increase in
GameStop’s market value in a single day).
4. See generally Barbara A. Bliss, Peter Molk & Frank Partnoy, Negative Activism, 97 WASH. U. L. REV.
1333 (2020).
5. Caitlin McCabe, Robinhood, Other Brokerages Restrict Trading on GameStop, AMC, WALL ST. J.
(Jan. 28, 2021, 9:05 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/online-brokerages-restrict-trading-on-gamestop-amcamid-frenetic-trading-11611849934 [https://perma.cc/JV8C-E98G].
6. Ortenca Aliaj & Robin Wigglesworth, Jim Chanos Laments Politicisation of ‘Surreal’ GameStop
Saga, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/b6542381-0074-48ed-a6fe-f8ebb6cb1e8e
[https://perma.cc/Q3UV-PEK8]. The confusion and knee-jerk reactions resembled other responses to financial
crises, which have often resulted in regulation. See generally Steven A. Bank & Brian R. Cheffins, Corporate
Law’s Critical Junctures 4 (Univ. of Cambridge, Working Paper No. 25/2021, 2021) (arguing that much of corporate and securities law has been created during “critical junctures,” following a combination of a lengthy period
of depressed share prices and a perception that business wrongdoing was integrally related to the slump).
7. Representative Jeff Fortenberry claimed that “Big Hedge . . . has made trillions shorting great American companies facing a rough patch . . . . Now they are getting a comeuppance. . . .” Representative Ro Khanna
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Unfortunately, the policy discussions surrounding this battle have not reflected the empirical evidence regarding the benefits and costs of short selling
and negative activism.8 Moreover, although the public debate suggested that
these attacks on short sellers are a novel problem requiring immediate reform,
the core activities are not new.9 Indeed, this epic battle is merely the most recent
example of negative activism in the financial markets. We believe the debate
about these events would benefit from some perspective and context, as well as
evidence about the long-term benefits and costs associated with these activities.
Shareholder activism arguably has been the most important topic in business law scholarship and corporate legal practice during the past decade.10 Our
previous contribution to this literature was to distinguish between “positive”
shareholder activism, which seeks to profit from interventions that increase share
prices,11 and its mirror image, “negative” shareholder activism, which uses short
selling to profit from interventions that reduce share prices.12
Whereas positive activists target companies they see as undervalued with
upside potential, negative activists target companies they see as overvalued or
even potentially fraudulent.13 Consider two controversial high-profile examples
stated: “Some people go get fancy degrees, know the right people, and spend all day in front of their computers
short selling . . . . And it’s a form of manipulation that has hurt our country.” Lisa Lerer & Astead W. Herndon,
When Ted Cruz and A.O.C. Agree: Yes, the Politics of GameStop Are Confusing, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/31/us/politics/gamestop-robinhood-democrats-republicans.html
[https://perma.cc/W75M-TFJA].
8. Bliss, Molk & Partnoy, supra note 4, at 1376.
9. See, e.g., Muddy Waters Research (@muddywatersre), TWITTER (Jan. 31, 2020, 10:00 AM),
https://twitter.com/muddywatersre/status/1223274746017722371?lang=en [https://perma.cc/72EQ-BJSG].
10. For prominent examples, see generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang & Thomas Keusch,
Dancing with Activists, 137 J. FIN. ECON. 1 (2020); Assaf Hamdani & Sharon Hannes, The Future of Shareholder
Activism, 99 B.U. L. REV. 971 (2019); Leo E. Strine Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood
Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870
(2017); C.N.V. Krishnan, Frank Partnoy & Randall S. Thomas, The Second Wave of Hedge Fund Activism: The
Importance of Reputation, Clout, and Expertise, 40 J. CORP. FIN. 296 (2016); K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M.
Sepe, The Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards, 68 STAN. L. REV. 67 (2016) (examining whether staggered
boards provide value in the face of increased activism and other shareholder interventions); Lucian A. Bebchuk,
Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085 (2015);
Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863 (2013); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth that Insulating
Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637 (2013); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr.,
The Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 39 (2012); William W. Bratton &
Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653 (2010); Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Investor Activism: Reshaping the Playing Field? (UCLA Sch. of L., Research Paper No. 08-12,
2008); Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance,
and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729 (2008).
11. See, e.g., Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate
Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1730 (2008) (demonstrating that interventions by market
participants engaging in positive activism were associated with positive abnormal returns of approximately 7%
surrounding the announcement of activism).
12. See Bliss, Molk & Partnoy, supra note 4, at 1337 n.13 (demonstrating that interventions by market
participants engaging in negative activism were associated with negative abnormal returns of approximately 7%
surrounding the announcement of activism); see also Joshua Mitts, Short and Distort 4 (Colum. L. and Econ.,
Working Paper No. 592, 2020) (showing that pseudonymous attacks on companies are followed by sharp stock
price declines, and later reversals).
13. See Muddy Waters Research, supra note 9.
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of negative activism from last year. On January 31, 2020, Muddy Waters Research posted on Twitter an anonymous eighty-nine page report that claimed
Luckin Coffee Inc., a Chinese coffeehouse chain with more than 4,500 stores,
had falsified its financial reporting.14 Muddy Waters simultaneously announced
that it had bet against the company’s shares.15 In April 2020, Luckin Coffee revealed that its 2019 sales were fabricated, its shares fell 80%, trading of its shares
was halted; and the company filed for bankruptcy in February 2021.16 Similarly,
Wirecard, a multi-billion dollar payments processing company, collapsed in
2020 after several short sellers had made large bets against the company, claiming its accounting was dubious and spawning a Financial Times exposé.17 Both
cases generated strong reactions from investors, regulators, and academics;18 for
example, BaFin, Germany’s financial regulator, first attacked the Financial
Times instead of Wirecard after the initial fraud allegations were made.19
In this Article, we extend our prior research on negative activism, following
a similar path to the one followed in the literature on positive activism. In that
literature, once it became widely accepted that a targeted company’s share price
on average increases during the days surrounding the announcement of activism,20 scholars investigated the substance of the ensuing battle between activists
and managers of targeted firms,21 including the long-term changes at those targets.22 Similarly, we investigate here the substance of negative activism over
time, focusing on long-term changes at companies targeted by negative activists.

14. See LUCKIN COFFEE: FRAUD + FUNDAMENTALLY BROKEN BUSINESS 1 (2020), https://drive.google.
com/file/d/1LKOYMpXVo1ssbWQx8j4G3-strg6mpQ7F/view [https://perma.cc/7RG2-59PA].
15. See Muddy Waters Research, supra note 9.
16. See Amelia Lucas, Shares of China’s Luckin Coffee Plummet 80% After Investigation Finds COO
Fabricated Sales, CNBC (Apr. 2, 2020, 9:01 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/02/luckin-coffee-stock-plummets-after-investigation-finds-coo-fabricated-sales.html [https://perma.cc/7FBY-V44R]; Rachel Chang &
Jinshan Hong, Luckin Coffee Files Bankruptcy in U.S., Will Keep Shops Open, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 5, 2021, 2:43
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-05/luckin-coffee-files-for-chapter-15-bankruptcy-innew-york-kks1k2hv [https://perma.cc/2E4J-9V3Q].
17. See JAN PIETER KRAHNEN & KATJA LANGENBUCHER, LEIBNIZ INST. FIN. RSCH. SAFE, THE WIRECARD
LESSONS: A REFORM PROPOSAL FOR THE SUPERVISION OF SECURITIES MARKETS IN EUROPE 2 (2020),
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/222230/1/1703734998.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6XN-DLWU] (describing various aspects of the 2020 Wirecard scandal); Dan McCrum, Wirecard’s Suspect Accounting Practices Revealed, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/19c6be2a-ee67-11e9-bfa4-b25f11f42901
[https://perma.cc/789A-GQQ7].
18. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Activist Short Selling Today: The Two Sides of the Coin, CLS BLUE SKY
BLOG (July 7, 2020), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2020/07/07/activist-short-selling-today-the-two-sidesof-the-coin/ [https://perma.cc/5HYM-EZWK] (describing the controversial debate about short selling surrounding the Luckin Coffee and Wirecard scandals).
19. Dan McCrum, Wirecard and Me: Dan McCrum on Exposing a Criminal Enterprise, FIN. TIMES (Sept.
2, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/745e34a1-0ca7-432c-b062-950c20e41f03 [https://perma.cc/M2GKXCQT].
20. See generally Brav et al., supra note 11.
21. See, e.g., Krishnan et al., supra note 10, at 297 (documenting the strategies of different categories of
positive activists).
22. See Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, supra note 10, at 1083, 1120–23
(finding no evidence that the initial price spike associated with activism is followed by negative long-term returns, using a five-year window after interventions).
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Positive and negative shareholder activists have diametrically opposed
goals for their targets. Positive activists buy shares to enhance firm value by persuading managers to improve operations, sell off underperforming units, or reveal new information to the public.23 In contrast, negative activists typically “sell
short”24 a company’s shares instead of buying them: in a classic short sale, the
seller borrows shares of stock that she does not yet own and sells those shares at
current market prices; the short seller later “covers” this short position by purchasing shares at a future date and then returning them to the share lender to
satisfy the loan.25 Thus, the short seller profits when the share price declines between her sale and subsequent purchase. Negative activists thereby seek to profit
from, and have incentives to cause, the destruction of value at companies, including the revelation of negative information about their targets, results that are the
opposite of those sought by positive activists.26
As we show, negative activism is important and surprisingly common, with
hundreds of examples in recent years. Some previous instances have involved
large public companies, such as Luckin Coffee and Wirecard—or before them
Enron and Herbalife—that are embroiled in controversy.27 Some negative activists play a quasi-regulatory role, akin to that of the Securities and Exchange Commission or private attorneys general, making claims of corporate mismanagement or misleading disclosures.28 Like positive activists, negative activists use a
range of strategies, including a mix of long positions in some companies and
23. See, e.g., Krishnan et al., supra note 10, at 297 (confirming the average abnormal stock price increases
of over 7% during the period immediately surrounding the public announcement of an activist intervention and
investigating the varying associations with positive returns); Strine, supra note 10, at 1934–56 (discussing potential negative effects of investor activism on retail investors that may justify defensive measures). For an example of the conflicts generated by activist interventions, see Zachery Kouwe, Target’s Shareholders Strongly
Reject Dissident Slate, Ending Divisive Proxy Battle, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/05/29/business/29target.html [https://perma.cc/PK3N-VMPW].
24. See Short Sales, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (OCT. 29, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/answers/
shortsale.htm [https://perma.cc/MSU2-L5W5]. Negative activists, like positive activists, also can profit from using options to profit from share price changes. See Bliss, Molk & Partnoy, supra note 4, at 1338.
25. Short Sales, supra note 24.
26. Our concept of negative activists therefore encompasses a larger group than activists who profit from
short positions. In addition to, or instead of, shorting, activists might hold derivative instruments that function
like shorted shares, including put options and other derivatives such as credit default swaps, which some market
participants have used as part of strategies to trigger events of default in corporate debt instruments. See, e.g.,
Shaun J. Mathew & Daniel E. Wolf, Shareholder Activism: Evolving Tactics, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP.
GOVERNANCE (Aug. 23, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/08/23/shareholder-activism-evolving-tactics/ [https://perma.cc/TL47-4JM4] (describing bondholders acquiring shareholder voting rights to trigger company insolvency); Vincent S.J. Buccola, Jameson K. Mah & Tai Zhang, The Myth of Creditor Sabotage, 87 U.
CHI. L. REV. 2029, 2033 (2020) (arguing that this problem is overstated). For convenience, we focus in the Article
on activists who profit from short sales of companies, as that method currently appears to be the most common
form of negative activism. However, our implications apply to the broader set of negative activists who hold
other instruments that pay off when the share price declines.
27. Valeant Pharmaceuticals is another prominent example, which we discuss later in the Article. See Lucinda Shen, Bill Ackman Finally Apologizes for His ‘Huge Mistake’ with Valeant, FORTUNE (Mar. 29, 2017,
12:15 PM), http://fortune.com/2017/03/29/valeant-pharmaceuticals-stock-bill-ackman-pershing-square-hedgefund-letter/ [https://perma.cc/VA53-D8Z5].
28. See, e.g., Jessica M. Erickson, Overlitigating Corporate Fraud: An Empirical Examination, 97 IOWA
L. REV. 49, 54 (2011) (exploring the interaction between various private and public actors in enforcing securities
fraud prohibitions).
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short positions in others.29 Notwithstanding these parallels, the literature on
shareholder activism has primarily focused on positive activism, even though
negative activism constitutes a significant portion of activist activity.30
As we further show, negative activism presents crucial policy challenges.
As the word “activism” implies, “negative activists do not sit back and wait . . .
for stock prices to decline so that their short positions will gain value”; instead,
they actively attempt to cause an immediate decline in share prices.31 In a market
economy that typically prioritizes value creation, rather than value destruction,
negative activism might, at least initially, seem fundamentally troubling or manipulative, given its explicit mission to destroy value.
Indeed, studies have found that an increase in short selling is on average
closely followed by negative news,32 and the literature on short selling recently
has interpreted this association as a potentially deleterious short-term effect, rather than as a positive aspect of price discovery.33 For example, Professor Joshua
Mitts has argued that negative activism can reflect fraud or manipulation, though
that argument is focused on negative activism in the relatively short term.34 Likewise, twelve business law professors, including one of us, recently petitioned the
SEC to impose a duty to update promptly a voluntary short position disclosure
that no longer reflects current holdings or trading intentions, and to clarify that
rapidly closing a short position after publishing or commissioning a report can
constitute fraudulent “scalping” in violation of Rule 10b-5.35 These publications
suggest that some forms of negative activism pose short-term risks and costs.
More broadly, leading securities law scholars have long expressed skepticism about short selling, and they have highlighted potentially manipulative or
fraudulent trading strategies related to short selling.36 For example, Professor
Donald Langevoort has argued that intentionally destabilizing a company’s share
price on a temporary basis by saying or doing something that takes advantage of
investors’ “heuristic thinking” should be deemed manipulation.37 Professor
29. Although scholarship on activism typically focuses on activists’ efforts to impact share prices, activists
also on occasion intervene in debt markets. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Hedge Fund Activism in
the Enforcement of Bondholder Rights, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 281, 292 (2009) (studying this phenomenon); Buccola
et al., supra note 26, at 2033–36 (examining net-short strategies of creditors and dismissing claims that credit
derivatives can and have been used to sabotage the markets).
30. See sources cited supra note 10.
31. Bliss, Molk & Partnoy, supra note 4, at 1339.
32. See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten & Paul C. Tetlock, Short Selling and the News: A
Preliminary Report on an Empirical Study, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 645, 646 (2009) (summarizing the literature
on short selling and price discovery).
33. See, e.g., Bliss, Molk & Partnoy, supra note 4, at 1341; Joshua Mitts, A Legal Perspective on Technology and the Capital Markets: Social Media, Short Activism and the Algorithmic Revolution 9 (Colum. L. & Econ.,
Working Paper No. 615, 2019).
34. See Mitts, supra note 33; see also Joshua Mitts, Short and Distort, 49 J. LEGAL STUD. 287, 287 (2020).
35. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Joshua Mitts, James D. Cox, Peter Molk & Edward Greene, Petition for Rulemaking on Short and Distort 3 (Colum. L. Sch. Scholarship Archive, Working Paper No. 2623, 2020).
36. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135, 161 (2002); James D. Cox, Insider Trading Regulation
and the Production of Information: Theory and Evidence, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 475, 491 (1986); Coffee, supra note
18.
37. Langevoort, supra note 36, at 161.

PARTNOY & MOLK .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 1]

LONG-TERM NEGATIVE ACTIVISM

1/31/22 10:29 PM

7

James Cox has criticized “scalping” schemes, which involve making statements
that lead investors to purchase or sell a stock, while failing to disclose a position
or an intent to trade in the opposite direction of one’s recommendation.38 Professor Jack Coffee has criticized various aspects of short selling by activists, though
he cites potential benefits as well.39
A wave of recent regulatory actions reflects this skepticism about short selling, even before GameStop’s recent events. During the early months of the
COVID-19 pandemic, many countries, including Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, South Korea, Spain, and the United Kingdom, banned or
otherwise restricted short selling, including widespread bans throughout Europe
during 2020.40 In March 2020, the European Securities and Markets Authority
imposed disclosure requirements on net short positions of 0.1% or more of a
company’s issued shares.41 U.S. regulators resisted such short selling bans during 2020, but federal securities regulation in the U.S. historically has restricted
short selling in various ways and continues to do so.42 The regulation of negative
activism is very much in flux, particularly in the U.S., where policy makers have
been considering various proposals to regulate negative activism, particularly in
response to the GameStop and “meme” stock controversy.43 Accordingly, it is
an important moment to assess the evidence about negative activism, including
its long-term impact on targeted companies, shareholders, and other impacted
parties.
Our main contribution is to provide just such evidence, for the first time in
the literature, which to date has relied largely on anecdotal evidence44 and aggregate market-impact studies.45 We take advantage of the passage of several
years since the final collection date of the database we used in our previously
published research,46 and we report the details of additional subsequent handcollected data regarding the long-term effects of negative activism on targeted
38. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 36, at 491. According to Professor Cox, “the violation in scalping cases is
the nondisclosure of the advisor’s purchase and intent to sell after the recommendation is published. . . . A recommendation, therefore, is the sine qua non of a scalping violation. Prior to a recommendation, the advisor’s
isolated purchase is devoid of informational content. After a recommendation is proffered, the advisor’s trading
activity, past and future, has great meaning to investors assessing the recommendation’s authenticity.” Id. at 491.
39. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 18.
40. See Tom Matthews, Diane Lamarche, Yoko Takagi, Murad M. Daghles, Piero de Mattia & Willem
Van de Wiele, Short Selling Bans and Market Restrictions—Considerations for Investors, WHITE & CASE (Feb.
15, 2021), https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/short-selling-bans-and-market-restrictions-considerations-investors [https://perma.cc/E2VU-8ATW]; TRAVIS WHITMORE, STATE ST. ASSOCS., AN ACADEMIC VIEW:
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SHORT-SELLING BANS 2 (2020), https://www.statestreet.com/content/dam/statestreet/
documents/Articles/The_Effectiveness_of_Short-Selling_Bans_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3QT-G8LX].
41. See EUR. SEC. & MARKETS AUTH., ESMA DECISION OF 16 MARCH 2020 (2020), https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/esma70-155-9546_esma_decision_-_article_28_ssr_reporting_threshold.pdf
[https://perma.cc/69T7-XQZ3].
42. See Bliss, Molk & Partnoy, supra note 4, at 1373–76 (describing U.S. regulation of short selling).
43. See infra Sections IV.A, IV.C; see also McCabe, supra note 5 (discussing the GameStop controversy).
44. GameStop is the latest of a series of anecdotal cases spurring calls for reform. McCabe, supra note 5.
45. See, e.g., Pedro A.C. Saffi & Kari Sigurdsson, Price Efficiency and Short Selling 4 (IESE Bus. Sch.–
Univ. of Navarra, Working Paper No. 748, 2008); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Limits of Arbitrage,
52 J. FIN. 35, 49–50 (1997).
46. See Bliss, Molk & Partnoy, supra note 4, at 1373–76 (describing U.S. regulation of short selling).
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firms. We thus employ the same strategy as that followed in the positive activism
literature, where scholars initially demonstrated the short-term impact of positive
activism47 and then sought evidence of long-term effects.48
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II provides background on short
selling research and negative activism.49 We summarize the law and finance
studies of these topics, and we demonstrate the gaps in the literature that motivate
our Article.50 We push back against the inherent skepticism about short selling
and negative activism, and we suggest ways in which both can be normatively
desirable.51
In Part III, we describe the empirical findings based on our comprehensive
database of negative activism.52 We find striking parallels to the literature on the
long-term effects of positive activism, where scholars determined that short-term
abnormal returns were not reversed in the long-term and that targeted companies
had positive long-term operational results.53
We find that negative activism is associated with real and significant negative long-term effects at targeted companies.54 Importantly, we find that negative activism is associated with significant and negative long-term share returns
and operational performance, a sign that the announcement of negative activism
is not merely a short-term manipulative impact that is quickly reversed, but instead is an indication that a targeted company is significantly overvalued.55 This
result mirrors the long-term result found in the positive activism literature.56
We also document how negative activist interventions are strongly associated with subsequent litigation and regulatory intervention, and we report granular details about long-term effects, including “league tables” of the impact of
different law firms involved in litigation related to negative activist interventions.57 We demonstrate throughout that negative activism is not merely a shortterm phenomenon: it has real and lasting long-term impact.58
In addition, we apply our data to the current issue of securities class action
litigation. Observers have noted an apparent increase in this form of litigation,
particularly event-driven securities litigation, raising concerns that it leads to
low-merit nuisance suits rather than deterring fraud or compensating investors,59
and the United States Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in a case
47. See Brav et al., supra note 10, at 1755.
48. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 10, at 1096.
49. See infra Part II.
50. See infra Part II.
51. See infra Part IV.
52. See infra Part III.
53. See infra Section III.A.3; Bebchuk et al., supra note 10, at 1155.
54. See infra Section III.A.
55. See infra Section III.A.
56. See infra Part III; Bebchuk et al., supra note 10, at 1155.
57. See infra Section III.B (describing class action litigation); see also infra Section III.C (describing regulatory actions).
58. See infra Section III.A.
59. See, e.g., Michelle Reed & Matthew Lloyd, Stemming the Tide of Meritless Securities Class Actions,
THOMSON REUTERS: EXPERT ANALYSIS (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.akingump.com/a/web/102513/SEC-ReedLloyd.pdf [https://perma.cc/VR7U-PPPY].

PARTNOY & MOLK .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 1]

LONG-TERM NEGATIVE ACTIVISM

1/31/22 10:29 PM

9

addressing issues central to this practice.60 Our evidence is consistent with some
of the criticism of securities class actions,61 but it also suggests that such litigation is less prevalent than many have asserted.
Finally, we report data related to the intra-corporate effects of negative activism, exploring the relationship between negative activism and director and officer turnover, financial restatements, and auditor changes.62 Although this link
is comparatively weak, we present evidence that it is still meaningful and normatively desirable.
In Part IV, we turn to regulation and policy.63 First, we consider several
policy proposals related to different categories of negative activism, including
several proposals left open in our prior work.64 We argue that many short-term
restrictions of negative activism are potentially unwarranted. Our evidence that
short-term price impacts are not later reversed, that negative activism makes securities markets more informationally efficient, and that negative activism gives
rise to class actions and regulatory actions,65 suggests negative activism can add
significant value to the securities markets. Indeed, to the extent that our results
show short-term reactions to the announcement of negative activism do not fully
reflect these long-term positive impacts,66 then it is an argument for relaxing
regulation of short selling, not imposing higher regulatory burdens. However, if
the long-term price declines are instead due to operational impediments stemming from the activism itself that would not have occurred but for the activism,
or that class actions and regulatory actions are undesirable, then more extensive
regulation of negative activism could be warranted.
We also assess three new categories of policy proposals related to the longterm effects of negative activism.67 First, we consider ways in which negative
activism might reinforce the private attorney general role played by shareholders
in securities class action litigation, by acting as a filter for discerning the most
meritorious cases.68
Second, we discuss how regulators might explicitly embrace negative activism as a signal for future investigations.69 Regulators could look systematically at short positions and announcements by negative activists as a source of
potential regulatory actions, and we suggest several approaches for them to do
60. See Brief for the Petitioner, Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. v. Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys., 141 S. Ct. 1951 (2021)
(No. 20-222); see also Goldman Sachs Group. Inc. v. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System, SCOTUSBLOG
https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/goldman-sachs-group-inc-v-arkansas-teacher-retirement-system/
[https://perma.cc/UM8V-9EJ3] (last visited Nov. 20, 2021).
61. See infra Section III.B; Note, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Rise of Securities-Fraud Class
Actions, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1067, 1068 (2019).
62. See infra Section III.D; see also Tables 15–17.
63. See infra Part IV.
64. See infra Section IV.A; see also Bliss, Molk & Partnoy, supra note 4, at 1376–91 (discussing policy
questions).
65. See infra Part IV.
66. See infra Section IV.A.
67. See infra Section IV.B.
68. See infra Section IV.B.
69. See infra Section IV.C.
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so.70 Regulators could also track the size of short positions and related commentary to anticipate GameStop-like events that involve crowdsourced trading in
shares of companies that have been targeted by short sellers.71
Third, we examine how negative activism might be a source of improvements in corporate governance and operations at public companies.72 Specifically, we suggest that corporate boards consider soliciting annual reports from
their largest short sellers.73 These reports could include the strongest cases from
negative activists about problems at targeted firms, and arguments about why the
firms’ shares are overvalued. We discuss how policy changes might facilitate,
encourage, and even protect boards that seek this reporting by negative activists.74
Given the evidence and arguments presented here, we believe scholars and
policy makers should shift away from their presumptive skepticism about short
selling and negative activism. It is true that negative activism could be substantively undesirable, by destroying company value that would not otherwise occur
or leading to inefficient class actions and regulatory actions. On the other hand,
negative activism has the potential to provide substantively desirable, albeit perhaps intuitively unappealing, disciplining forces to the market. Our evidence supports both stories, and differentiating between the two must await further study.
However, for now, we see negative activists as potentially a private law version
of some public law actors—such as free speech advocates—who might appear
to have normatively undesirable characteristics but whose activities are central
to the protection of important principles and policy.75 We might not instinctively
side with a negative activist, just as we might not instinctively side with a controversial speaker seeking First Amendment protection, but their presence, in
both cases, can be central to desirable policy results.

70. See infra Section III.C.
71. See Short Squeeze, CORP. FIN. INST., https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/trading-investing/short-squeeze/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2021) [https://perma.cc/EN8S-NA4R].
72. See infra Section IV.D.
73. See infra Section IV.D.
74. See infra Section IV.D.
75. We have in mind Cohen v. California and its progeny. See 403 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1971) (upholding the
First Amendment rights of Paul Robert Cohen wearing a jacket with the words “Fuck the Draft” while in the Los
Angeles courthouse); cf. Thornton McEnery, Stormy Daniels Appears in Carson Block’s Filthy Financial
“Awards Show”, N.Y. POST (Dec. 4, 2019, 1:08 PM), https://nypost.com/2019/12/04/stormy-daniels-appears-incarson-blocks-filthy-financial-awards-show/ [https://perma.cc/6C9X-MVQP] (describing the “Fidouchies”
awards show hosted by Muddy Waters Research, a leading negative activist firm). See generally Clay Calvert,
Revisiting the Right to Offend Forty Years After Cohen v. California: One Case’s Legacy on First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1 (2018).
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II. SHORT SELLING AND NEGATIVE ACTIVISM: THE GAP IN THE LITERATURE
Historically, there have been two dominant narratives about short selling.76
One friendly perspective, rooted in finance literature, is that short selling generates significant benefits, particularly price discovery and informational efficiency.77 As this story goes, short selling helps make stock prices more accurate,
and accurate securities prices are desirable as informative signals that lead to the
efficient allocation of capital.78 Conversely, restrictions on short selling reduce
liquidity, increase volatility, and skew available information, leading to less accurate stock prices.79 According to this view, regulation that restricts or constrains short selling leads to mispricing and less informationally efficient markets.80
Scholars have long understood that managers have incentives to publicize
positive information about their operations, to make it easier and cheaper to raise
capital and potentially to increase manager compensation that depends on the
company’s stock price.81 In contrast, managers have less of an incentive to

76. Compare Peter Molk & Frank Partnoy, Institutional Investors as Short Sellers?, 99 B.U. L. REV. 837,
859–62 (2019) (describing a positive perspective of short selling), with Joseph E. Engelberg, Adam V. Reed &
Matthew C. Ringgenberg, Short-Selling Risk, 73 J. FIN. 755, 756 (2018) (describing risks of short selling).
77. See Molk & Partnoy, supra note 76, at 859 (describing the academic literature on some positive effects
of short selling); Paul Asquith, Parag A. Pathak & Jay R. Ritter, Short Interest, Institutional Ownership, and
Stock Returns, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 243, 256 (2005) (suggesting that binding short-sale constraints reduce price accuracy); Wolfgang Bessler & Marco Vendrasco, The 2020 European Short-Selling Ban and the Effects on Market
Quality, 42 FIN. RSCH. LETTERS 101886, 3–4, (2021). Our description of short selling’s benefits is drawn from
our prior work.
78. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 DUKE
L.J. 977, 1005–08 (1992) (noting that “accurate stock prices further efficient allocation of capital”).
79. See, e.g., Engelberg et al., supra note 76; see also U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SHORT SALE POSITION
AND TRANSACTION REPORTING 135 (2014), https://www.sec.gov/files/short-sale-position-and-transaction-reporting%2C0.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PWX-J454] (“The academic literature provides ample theoretical support
for, and empirical evidence of, the importance of short selling for liquidity.”); id. at 134 (“Theoretical studies
support the notion that short sellers promote price efficiency, finding that restrictions on short selling should lead
to less accurate prices, higher volatility, and should hinder price discovery.”).
80. See, e.g, Ekkehart Boehmer & Juan (Julie) Wu, Short Selling and the Price Discovery Process, 26
REV. FIN. STUD. 287, 317–18 (2012) (“We find that the total effect of shorting on efficiency is lower when shorting is more constrained.”); Karl B. Diether, Kuan-Hui Lee & Ingrid M. Werner, It’s SHO Time! Short-Sale Price
Tests and Market Quality, 64 J. FIN. 37, 38 (2009) (“[S]horting restrictions had no effect on the volatility of
returns.”); Owen A. Lamont & Jeremy C. Stein, Aggregate Short Interest and Market Valuations, 94 AM. ECON.
REV. 29, 32 (2004) (arguing that problems arise in markets from too little short selling, not too much); Joseph E.
Engelberg, Adam V. Reed & Matthew C. Ringgenberg, How Are Shorts Informed? Short Sellers, News, and
Information Processing, 105 J. FIN. ECON. 260, 278 (2012) (arguing negative information is not accurately reflected in stock prices as informed traders capitalize on superior information processing, not superior access to
information); Douglas W. Diamond & Robert E. Verrecchia, Constraints on Short-Selling and Asset Price Adjustment to Private Information, 18 J. FIN. ECON. 277, 302 (1987) (arguing short sale constraints reduce the “rate
at which private information is revealed to the public”); Harrison Hong & Jeremy C. Stein, Differences of Opinion, Short-Sales Constraints, and Market Crashes, 16 REV. FIN. STUD. 487, 491 (2003) (arguing some investors
do not trade due to constraints on short selling, preventing accurate information from being revealed to markets);
Edward M. Miller, Risk, Uncertainty, and the Divergence of Opinion, 32 J. FIN. 1151, 1166 (1977) (“In a market
with little or no short selling the demand for a particular security will come from the minority who hold the most
optimistic expectations about it.”).
81. See Molk & Partnoy, supra note 76, at 859–61.
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disclose negative information, except to the extent required by securities law.82
Accordingly, one would expect that voluntary disclosure of information would
be skewed in favor of positive information over negative information.83
A second perspective, advocated by some policy makers, financial market
participants, and corporate borrowers, vilifies short selling as evil and manipulative means of sacrificing company value for personal profit.84 Elon Musk, for
example, has fought a long-running battle against short sellers, saying that
“[s]hort selling should be illegal”85 and launching a set of limited edition short
shorts to reinforce the point.86 Regulators impose numerous direct costs on short
sellers, including institutional investors, with these risks in mind.87 Moreover,
short sellers frequently face regulatory scrutiny and litigation.88 The recent bans
on short selling in Europe are just the most recent example of regulators’ reflexive response when markets decline and short selling increases.89
Recent scholarly efforts to understand the costs and benefits of short selling
and negative activism have focused on short-term returns.90 Some studies, like
our prior work, examine the market reaction during the days surrounding announcements by negative activists about problems at targeted companies.91 For
example, Appel, Bulka, & Fos confirm our results in a study of short selling
campaigns by hedge funds, documenting abnormal returns to target of negative
activism of approximately 7% around the announcement date.92 Professor Joshua
Mitts has focused on potential short-term problems arising from anonymous announcements, which pose particular risks to the extent markets might overreact
82. For example, some studies have found that managers vary how information is disseminated in order to
reduce litigation risk. For a description of this literature, see Barbara A. Bliss, Frank Partnoy & Michael Furchtgott, Information Bundling and Securities Litigation, 65 J. ACCT. & ECON. 61, 62 (2018).
83. See id. at 68–70 (examining how managers bundle information to reduce the incidence and cost of
litigation).
84. See, e.g., Larry Kudlow, What Was the SEC Thinking?, NAT’L REV. (Aug. 13, 2007, 3:46 PM), https://
www.nationalreview.com/kudlows-money-politics/what-was-sec-thinking-larry-kudlow
[https://perma.cc/H6VH-HHXT] (asserting that restrictions on short selling help reduce market volatility and
prevent “bear raids,” and that the SEC’s removing the uptick rule was “an unbelievably lousy idea”).
85. Jonathan Garber, Elon Musk: ‘Short Selling Should Be Illegal’, FOX BUS. (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.
foxbusiness.com/markets/elon-musk-declares-short-sellling-should-be-illegal [https://perma.cc/85V8-EWW4].
86. See Emily Kirkpatrick, Elon Musk’s “S3XY” Short Shorts Sell Out in Minutes, VANITY FAIR (July
7, 2020), https://www.vanityfair.com/style/2020/07/elon-musk-tesla-short-shorts-sec [https://perma.cc/2727FPMR].
87. See, e.g., MANAGED FUNDS ASS’N, AN INTRODUCTION TO SHORT SELLING 7–12 (2018), http://hedgefundamentals.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/An-Introduction-to-Short-Selling_White-Paper.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YF3K-9HJR] (describing various costs associated with short selling).
88. See, e.g., Ian Appel & Vyacheslav Fos, Active Short Selling by Hedge Funds 12 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 609/2019, 2020) (describing regulatory scrutiny and litigation arising from short
selling); Owen A. Lamont, Go Down Fighting: Short Sellers vs. Firms, 2 REV. ASSET PRICING STUD. 1, 1–2
(2012) (noting the diverse legal and regulatory actions taken against short sellers).
89. See Matthews et al., supra note 40.
90. See Mark Desjardine & Rodolphe Durand, Activist Hedge Funds: Good for Some, Bad for Others?,
HEC PARIS (Mar. 30, 2021), https://www.hec.edu/en/knowledge/articles/activist-hedge-funds-good-some-badothers [https://perma.cc/CE6V-V6D6] (noting the focus on short-term returns in understanding short selling and
negative activism).
91. See, e.g., Bliss, Molk & Partnoy, supra note 4, at 1341.
92. See Appel & Fos, supra note 88, at 2–3.
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to the publication of salient negative news and generate opportunities for short
sellers to profit from false or misleading announcements.93 Boehmer, Jones, Wu,
and Zhang examined “long-term” short positions of sixty days, finding that initial
short-related drops do not reverse over this period.94
In our recent study of negative activism, we describe empirical evidence of
three categories of negative activism. First, we reported details about “informational” negative activists who sought to profit from disclosing negative information about companies, and we documented the short-term returns associated
with their announcements.95 We also examined returns for the one-year period
after announcement and found that the average buy-and-hold abnormal return for
our full sample of 825 observations was -22.43%.96 However, a sufficient time
period had not passed at the point of publication for us to analyze longer-term
returns in that study, nor did we study non-financial effects of short selling. We
also examined anecdotal evidence of “operational” negative activism, including
a hodgepodge of strategies designed to destroy value at firms,97 as well as “unintentional” negative activism, which were attempts by positive activists that
nevertheless were associated with negative announcement returns.98 We documented the short-term market reaction for these incidents as well.99
Neither our recent study, nor other published studies (to our knowledge)
have systematically examined the long-term effects of negative activism.100 One
reason for the gap in the literature is that it is more challenging to study negative
activism than positive activism. Studies of positive activism were facilitated by
required disclosures by activist investors once they held more than 5% of a targeted company’s shares.101 As a result, it was relatively straightforward to build
a database of positive activist interventions, and then study those companies over
the longer term.102 Of course, it took a few years after the initial short-term studies for scholars to report results based on the long-term changes at companies in
those databases.103
Now that a few years have passed, negative activism scholarship can fill
the gap, in the same way positive activism scholarship filled the gap during the
second wave of research. Before we turn to a description of our new evidence,
93. See Mitts, supra note 12, at 1 (finding that pseudonymous attacks on public companies are followed
by sharp stock price reversals).
94. Ekkehart Boehmer et al., What Do Short Sellers Know?, 24 REV. FIN. 1203 (2020).
95. See Bliss, Molk & Partnoy, supra note 4, at 1352–54.
96. Id. at 1354–55.
97. Id. at 1355–60.
98. Id. at 1360–67.
99. Id. at 1368.
100. Owen Lamont finds negative short- and long-term abnormal returns to firms that mount defenses
against short sellers or publicly accuse short sellers of wrongdoing; his study does not focus on activist short
sellers and is built on the unrepresentative sample of short selling events that provoke a significant public response from the target. Lamont, supra note 88.
101. See Bliss, Molk & Partnoy, supra note 4, at 1370–71.
102. See Krishnan, Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 10, at 297 (using a database of positive activist interventions to examine the differential effects of different categories of activists).
103. See Bebchuk, Brav & Jiang, supra note 10, at 1100 (examining long-term returns and operations after
positive activist interventions).
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we note a few limitations on the ability of researchers to study negative activism.
First, there is not the same assurance as there is with positive activism that the
databases being studied are comprehensive and unbiased by selection effects.
Short selling lacks disclosure requirements,104 so the available data sources for
negative activism are necessarily self-selected. We are mindful of potential bias
in using these data.
In addition, to the extent that negative activist interventions target smaller
companies, the evidence of follow-on long-term effects could be more limited.
Securities lawsuits and regulatory enforcement actions often prioritize large
firms over small ones.105 Securities class action recoveries are a function of the
size of the decline in market capitalization of the company associated with the
revelation of information about fraud.106 Likewise, regulatory action might be
more likely to deter fraudulent behavior if it is targeted at larger, higher-profile
targets, which regulators tend to favor, understandably so.107 Accordingly, researchers might expect to find that some long-term effects are more limited than
they would be with a sample of larger targeted companies.
Other hurdles to filling the gap in the literature related to long-term effects
include the need to hand collect information about changes at targeted firms over
the longer term. Moreover, the number of targets of negative activism is relatively small, making high-powered statistical analysis of long-term changes more
difficult.108 Likewise, there are not obvious econometric identification strategies
to test causality in this context; instead, the analysis is more amenable to a range
of social science techniques, including more qualitative assessment of evidence.
Notwithstanding these challenges, we are able to collect enough data and evidence of changes at targeted companies to glean reliable inferences about the
relationship between negative activist interventions and subsequent long-term
changes at targeted companies. We turn to that evidence next.
III. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Our empirical findings build on a rich dataset of negative activism-related
events collected by Activist Shorts Research reports from 2009 through 2016.109
Activist Shorts Research assembled these reports from voluntary public disclosure by negative activists. Because negative activism is not subject to the
104. See Bliss, Molk, & Partnoy, supra note 4, at 1373; see also United States-Shareholding Disclosure
Summary, AOSPHERE (June 18, 2021), https://www.aosphere.com/aos/shareholding-disclosure-united-statessummary [https://perma.cc/KB8N-QASX].
105. See Johnathan N. Eisenberg, The Year in Review: SEC Enforcement Actions Against Investment Advisers, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (Dec. 19, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/12/19/theyear-in-review-sec-enforcement-actions-against-investment-advisers/ [https://perma.cc/CWG3-DS8Z] (suggesting the SEC prioritizes firms with greater assets and clients).
106. See, e.g., Laarni T. Bulan & Laura E. Simmons, Securities Class Action Settlements—2019 Review
and Analysis, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (Mar. 11, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/
03/11/securities-class-action-settlements-2019-review-and-analysis/ [https://perma.cc/EXU6-W58U].
107. See Eisenberg, supra note 105.
108. See infra Sections III.B, III.C.
109. See infra Section III.A.

PARTNOY & MOLK .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 1]

LONG-TERM NEGATIVE ACTIVISM

1/31/22 10:29 PM

15

disclosure requirements of positive activism,110 this collection of voluntarily disclosed reports necessarily understates the extent of negative activism. In addition, we suspect the collection may not be representative of typical negative activism cases. Public disclosure risks reputational and financial costs,111 a point
made particularly vivid by the backlash against GameStop short sellers,112 so we
think it likely that activists voluntarily disclose, on balance, better-than-average
instances of negative activism to compensate for bearing these expected costs of
disclosure.113
We collected 825 reports of negative activism from Activist Shorts Research reports that targeted 573 different public companies from 2009 through
2016.114 The reports consist entirely of what we have elsewhere classified as
“informational negative activism,” where negative activists seek to uncover and
then communicate the truth about companies whose shares the activists believe
are overvalued.115 The targets span a wide variety of industries and market capitalizations, with a generally increasing number of targets over the sample period.116 The negative activists are a mixture of well-known activist investors and
firms as well as pseudonymous ones.117 In the Appendix, we provide fuller detail
about our negative activism targets and the distribution, over time, of negative
activism reports. We use these reports to assess a variety of ways that negative
activism impacts target company values and operations, which we develop below.

110. Bliss, Molk, & Partnoy, supra note 4, at 1373–76.
111. For instance, multiple negative activists in our sample were sued for defamation. See, e.g., Karen
Freifeld, New York Judge Orders Anonymous Blogger into Court Over Business Reports, INS. J. (May 14, 2012),
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/east/2012/05/14/247359.htm [https://perma.cc/V6EU-TV4J]. Costs of
disclosure are more fully identified in Bliss, Molk, & Partnoy, supra note 4, at 1347–48.
112. The allegations against Andrew Left, a prominent negative activist, were severe enough for him to vow
to stop engaging in public short recommendations. See Alicia McElhaney, ‘They’re Harassing Me However They
Can’: Citron’s Andrew Left on WallStreetBets and Shorting GameStop, INSTITUTIONAL INV. (Jan. 27, 2021),
https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1q9kwxpkbsr6r/They-re-Harassing-Me-However-They-Can-Citron-s-Andrew-Left-on-WallStreetBets-and-Shorting-GameStop [https://perma.cc/GQ69-MMME] (noting that
Andrew Left has experienced phone calls, a hacked Twitter account, in-person visits, and a fake Tinder profile
since shorting GameStop); see also Kevin Draper, Mets’ Cohen Deletes Twitter Account After Threats, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 30, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/30/sports/baseball/steve-cohen-mets-gamestopbarstool.html [https://perma.cc/7YTV-7YBC] (noting similar allegations against Mets owner who assisted hedge
fund that shorted GameStop).
113. Bliss, Molk & Partnoy, supra note 4, at 1347–48.
114. Reports, ACTIVIST INSIGHT, https://www.activistinsight.com/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2021) [https://
perma.cc/7ZDT-W9ZW].
115. Bliss, Molk & Partnoy, supra note 4, at 1345.
116. See Reports, supra note 114.
117. Bliss, Molk & Partnoy, supra note 4, at 1339; Reports, supra note 114.
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Long-Term Financial Impacts

We begin our empirical analysis by assessing the financial effects of negative activism. In our prior work with Barbara Bliss, we found that negative activism is associated with -7% cumulative abnormal returns in the short term, during calendar windows immediately surrounding the activist’s public
disclosure.118 Those initial stock price drops did not reverse during the following
year.119 We reproduce the substance of those short-term cumulative abnormal
returns findings in Table 1 below, and we refer the interested reader to our prior
article for additional detail about short-term cumulative abnormal returns and the
empirical models employed to derive our estimates.120
TABLE 1: SHORT-TERM RETURNS TO NEGATIVE ACTIVISM, 2009-2016

Average
Standard Deviation
Events

Holding Period (in days)
[-1,1]
[-3,3]
[-10,1]
-6.96%***
-7.19%***
-5.64%***
(0.44)
(0.60)
(0.96)
825
825
825

* significant
** significant
at 5%;
*** significant
at 1%.
Robusterrors
standard
*significant
at 10%,at**10%;
significant
at 5%, ***
significant
at 1%. Robust
standard
in parentheses.
errors in parentheses.

As Table 1 shows, the short-term financial returns to negative activism are
significant and negative for a variety of holding periods. In this Part, we take
advantage of the passage of time to analyze, in detail, the longer-term financial
returns to targets of negative activism, extending the window of analysis significantly beyond the year following disclosure. We start with a buy-and-hold analysis.
1.

Buy-and-Hold Analysis

We construct a portfolio of all firms that are targeted by negative activism,
and we compare the compounded returns of that portfolio to compounded market
returns to determine the resulting buy-and-hold abnormal returns (“BHAR”) of
targeted firms.121 Intuitively, the buy-and-hold approach is designed to replicate
the experience of an investor who buys shares and holds them for a period of
time before eventually selling them.122

118. Bliss, Molk, & Partnoy, supra note 4, at 1350. Cumulative abnormal returns were calculated using a
market-adjusted model relative to CRSP value-weighted returns.
119. Id. at 1355.
120. Id. at 1350.
121. For an early application of this method, see Jay R. Ritter, The Long-Run Performance of Initial Public
Offerings, 46 J. FIN. 3, 14 (1991).
122. Eugene F. Fama, Market Efficiency, Long-Term Returns, and Behavioral Finance, 49 J. FIN. ECON.
283, 294 (1998). For more on the usefulness of BHAR in financial event studies, see Brad M. Barber & John D.
Lyon, Detecting Long-Run Abnormal Stock Returns: The Empirical Power and Specification of Test Statistics,
43 J. FIN. ECON. 341, 344 (1997).
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Formally, we calculate the BHAR for each firm in our portfolio at time t
using the following specification:
%&' (#,*+,!-#)

𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅!,# =
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$/0

%&' (#,*+,!-#)
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$/0

where 𝑅!,# is the day j return (including dividends) of firm i, 𝑅𝑚# is the day
j CRSP market return (including dividends), and delist is the date that firm i delists (if applicable).123 If a targeted firm delists before the end of our analysis
period, we invest the proceeds in the market portfolio for BHAR calculations, a
conservative assumption that biases against finding negative returns and avoids
survivorship problems.
We construct two fixed-allocation portfolios from these returns: an equalweighted portfolio that equally weights the targeted companies of negative activism, and a value-weighted portfolio that weights the targets according to their
relative market capitalizations at the time of the activist event.124 To avoid double-counting targets of repeated, related negative activism, we remove firm-activist allegations occurring within 180 days of earlier negative activism against
the same firm, or allegations outside this window that repeated earlier allegations.
Figure 1 shows the buy-and-hold abnormal returns125 for these two portfolios, as well as the median company-level buy-and-hold abnormal return, for the
four calendar years days (1008 trading days) following the negative activist’s
announcement.126

123. We use CRSP equal- or value-weighted market returns depending on whether we will be calculating
equal- or value-weighted portfolio returns with these numbers.
124. We calculate these weights using market capitalizations as of ten trading days before the activist’s
announcement to eliminate any disproportionate effects the announcement might have on target firm valuations.
125. The corresponding CRSP market returns used for each BHAR analysis are the equal-weighted index
and value-weighted index, respectively.
126. We cannot extend our analysis beyond four years, because our sample period of activism concludes at
the end of 2016.
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FIGURE 1: BUY-AND-HOLD ABNORMAL RETURNS OF NEGATIVE ACTIVISM
TARGETS
16%

trading days from announcement

0%

Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return

Value-weighted portfolio

-16%

Equal-weighted portfolio
-33%
Median

-49%

-65%

The Figure reveals two striking pieces of information. First, both portfolios,
as well as the median return, exhibit meaningful runups in abnormal returns immediately prior to the negative activism.127 This increase is especially pronounced for our equal-weighted portfolio.128 This phenomenon suggests the activist has already built a short thesis and is waiting for prices to rise sufficiently
to justify the disproportionate costs of short selling129 and negative activism.130
The other noteworthy attribute of Figure 1 is that short-term stock price
drops at the negative activism announcement date do not reverse even years after
the announcement. On a portfolio basis, the companies targeted by negative activists underperform the market as a whole throughout our entire three-year time
horizon.131 Although some of our negative activists no doubt take only shortterm short interests in their targets, on balance their targets continue to underperform the market long into the future, and extended short positions would continue
to be profitable.132
127. See supra Figure 1.
128. See supra Figure 1.
129. For discussion of these costs, see Molk & Partnoy, supra note 76, at 840.
130. See Bliss, Molk & Partnoy, supra note 4, at 1347–48 and accompanying text.
131. See supra Figure 1.
132. Math dictates that an initial underperformance will continue to generate divergent buy-and-hold returns
even if the target later generates market rate of returns. However, that rate of divergence will be relatively modest,
on the order of 2%–3% per year after a particularly sharp initial drop. Figure 1 shows significantly greater rates
of decline, on a shallower initial drop, suggesting sustained below-market performance by targets of negative
activism. See supra Figure 1.
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On a portfolio basis, then, negative activism appears to accomplish its goal
of reducing company stock prices. Yet on an individual company basis, there is,
of course, considerable variation in this success.133 Figure 2 provides a representative illustration, charting BHAR to selected individual campaigns from
three well-known short seller activists: Carson Block’s Muddy Waters’ campaign against Focus Media, Andrew Left’s Citron Research’s campaign against
Valeant Pharmaceuticals, and James Chanos’s Kynikos Associates’ campaign
against Keurig Green Mountain. For this Figure, we terminate the relevant
BHAR if the company delists.
Muddy Waters alleged that Focus Media, a digital media provider in China,
had fabricated its financials.134 Focus Media, after denying the allegations,135
was later investigated by the SEC,136 sued in a class-action lawsuit by its shareholders,137 and delisted from the NASDAQ138 for the reasons initially identified
by Muddy Waters. Citron Research’s campaign against Valeant Pharmaceuticals, which we discuss in detail later in this Article,139 attracted the attention of
multiple regulatory bodies and a class action suit from its shareholders that ultimately settled for $1.2 billion.140 Kynikos Associates’ campaign against Keurig
Green Mountain expressed skepticism about its expansion into single-serve cold
products.141 The company was taken private two years later.142
Although the targets of all three campaigns experienced long-term stock
price drops, all had periods of time during which the companies’ stock prices
rose markedly.143 Kynikos Associates’ campaign, for example, did not begin to
pay off until approximately one year after it was first initiated, and much of those
133. See supra Figure 1.
134. Muddy Waters Initiating Coverage on FMCN - Strong Sell, MUDDY WATERS RSCH. (Nov. 21, 2011),
https://www.muddywatersresearch.com/research/fmcn/initiating-coverage-fmcn/
[https://perma.cc/XS6WBRNC].
135. Press Release, Focus Media Holding Ltd., Focus Media Responds to the Allegations Raised by Muddy
Waters (Nov. 22, 2011, 8:03 AM), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/focus-media-responds-to-the-allegations-raised-by-muddy-waters-134313148.html [https://perma.cc/LLT3-KPS4].
136. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, China-Based Company and CEO to Pay $55.6 Million for
Inaccurate Disclosures (Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-223.html [https://perma.
cc/46VJ-Z65V].
137. David McAfee, Focus Media to Pay $3.7M to Resolve Investor Class Claims, LAW360 (May 13, 2014,
8:17 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/537570/focus-media-to-pay-3-7m-to-resolve-investor-class-claims
[https://perma.cc/K3A7-PU42].
138. Focus Media Holding LTD., Notification of Removal from Listing and/or Registration Under Section
12(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Form 25) (May 23, 2013).
139. See infra notes 267–81 and accompanying text.
140. See Bausch Health Agrees to Pay $1.21 Billion to Settle Share Price Lawsuit, REUTERS (Dec. 16, 2019,
6:59 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bausch-health-litigation/bausch-health-agrees-to-pay-1-21-billion-to-settle-share-price-lawsuit-idUSKBN1YK163 [https://perma.cc/AMC5-HC35].
141. Bruno J. Navarro, Jim Chanos: Best Shorts in a Bull Market, CNBC: HALFTIME REP. (May 16, 2014,
6:50 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2014/05/15/jim-chanos-best-shorts-in-a-bull-market.html [https://perma.cc/
BT5F-Z96T].
142. Press Release, Keurig Green Mountain, Inc., Keurig Green Mountain to Be Acquired by JAB Holding
Company-Led Investor Group for $92 Per Share in Cash (Dec. 7, 2015), http://investor.keuriggreenmountain.com/news-releases/news-release-details/keurig-green-mountain-be-acquired-jab-holding-company-led
[https://perma.cc/Q4PX-CU3X].
143. See infra Figure 2.
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gains disappeared seven months later upon the announcement of Keurig Green
Mountain’s going-private transaction.144
FIGURE 2: BUY-AND-HOLD ABNORMAL RETURNS OF SELECTED
NEGATIVE ACTIVISM TARGETS
30%

trading days from announcement

Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return

0%

-30%

Muddy Waters
(Focus Media)
Kynikos Associates (Keurig Green Mountain)

-60%

-90%
Citron Research (Valeant)
-120%

-150%

Returns in our sample vary not just across short sellers, but also across
campaigns conducted by the same short seller.145 To illustrate, we focus on the
“pseudonymous” short seller known as “SkyTides.” As Professor Joshua Mitts
has identified, SkyTides waged an informational campaign against Insulet citing
evidence of improper behavior by the CEO.146 SkyTides’ efforts were rewarded
with a short-term price drop.147 However, the drop reversed, and the stock performed admirably in the long run.148 SkyTides’ other short campaigns against
other companies were also mixed, with campaigns against ConforMIS and TanTech resulting in short- and long-term declines, while the campaign against Vocera exhibited a short-term drop followed by a striking reversal.149

144. See infra Figure 2.
145. See supra Figure 2.
146. See Mitts, supra note 12, at 8. Professor Mitts uses the example as evidence of potentially manipulative
short selling. Id.
147. See infra Figure 3.
148. See infra Figure 3.
149. Given the experience with Vocera especially, it is perhaps surprising that investors would credit
SkyTides’s later disclosures about Insulet as found by Mitts. Vocera’s buy-and-hold abnormal returns were flat
on the day of SkyTides’s initial negative disclosure, positive 6% during the following two trading days, and
positive during the long term. See supra Figure 3. An investor shorting on SkyTides’s advice could have made
money only by covering the short between four and sixty-four trading days after the initial disclosure.
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FIGURE 3: BUY-AND-HOLD ABNORMAL RETURNS OF SELECT SKYTIDES
TARGETS
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Finally, we examine how buy-and-hold returns might vary for the subset of
negative activism campaigns that target problematic governance issues. By exposing improper behavior at public companies, negative activism might reduce
company values in the short term, but those values might potentially increase in
the long-term. Theoretically, when negative activism correctly identifies governance failures and other managerial misdeeds, it offers the opportunity for those
problems to be corrected in ways that might be incorporated in long term stock
prices.150 Moreover, anecdotal evidence shows that negative activists have followed initial short positions in companies with long positions, expressing confidence in the potential for those companies’ reformed operations following the
negative disclosure.151 For instance, Citron’s Andrew, after shorting Valeant
150. See Bliss, Molk & Partnoy, supra note 4, at 1392–93 (noting negative activism’s potential to increase
long-term values); Coffee, supra note 18 (noting the prevalence of “‘pseudonymous’ sellers that sell short, publish a lengthy, detailed, and plausible attack on the target company, but then close their short positions shortly
thereafter (without disclosure), sometimes even going long in the stock to profit on any later rebound in the stock
price when management replies.”).
151. See, e.g., Bill Alpert, Overstock.com: Look Who’s Bullish Now!, BARRON’S (Oct. 10, 2017, 6:26 PM),
https://www.barrons.com/articles/overstock-com-look-whos-bullish-now-1507674170 [https://perma.cc/QGN98XND]; Suhail Capital, Medidata: Why We Went Long and Why IBM Might Acquire It, SEEKING ALPHA (July
13, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://seekingalpha.com/article/3987682-medidata-why-went-long-and-why-ibm-mightacquire [https://perma.cc/B32N-XRWZ]; Fred Imbert, Citron’s Andrew Left: Yes, I’m Long Valeant, But . . .,
CNBC (May 17, 2016, 1:10 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/05/17/citrons-andrew-left-yes-im-long-valeantbut.html [https://perma.cc/UVA3-YJ85]; Adam Gefvert, Sky-mobi Is Dominating China’s Low-Cost Smartphone
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Pharmaceuticals amidst financial fraud allegations, later took a long position
once the company appointed a new CEO following a 75% drop in share prices.152
To assess negative activism’s potential to improve long-term financial returns, we repeat the BHAR calculation exercise for the subset of 286 negative
activism allegations potentially involving corporate governance.153 Figure 4 contains the results.
FIGURE 4: BUY-AND-HOLD ABNORMAL RETURNS, GOVERNANCERELATED NEGATIVE ACTIVISM

trading days from announcement

Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return
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Equal-weighted portfolio

-64%

-85%

App Market, SEEKING ALPHA (Mar. 13, 2014, 10:00 AM), https://seekingalpha.com/article/2085323-sky-mobiis-dominating-chinas-low-cost-smartphone-app-market [https://perma.cc/LN6E-GKPT]; Julia La Roche, Incredible! Whitney Tilson May Have Just Made the Best-Timed Trade that We Have Ever Heard of, BUS. INSIDER
(Apr. 30, 2012. 10:35 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/incredible-whitney-tilson-just-went-long-barnesand-noble-on-friday-after-being-short-2012-4 [https://perma.cc/T389-N6H9]; Chris Barth, Why Whitney Tilson,
Once Netflix’s Biggest Detractor, Is Thinking About Buying in, FORBES (Oct. 26, 2011, 10:01 AM), https://www.
forbes.com/sites/chrisbarth/2011/10/26/why-whitney-tilson-once-netflixs-biggest-detractor-is-thinking-aboutbuying-in/ [https://perma.cc/DYQ8-A5A4].
152. Imbert, supra note 151.
153. This corporate governance subset includes all allegations categorized by Activist Shorts Research as
involving accounting fraud, ineffective roll-up, major business fraud, misleading accounting, pyramid scheme,
stock promotion, and other illegal practices. The remaining categories that we did not include are bubble, competitive pressures, forthcoming dividend cut, industry issues, medical effectiveness, other overvaluation, overlevered, patent expiration, product ineffective, and upcoming earnings miss. As before, to avoid double-counting
targets of repeated, related negative activism, after building our governance-related activism events, we remove
firm-activist allegations occurring within 180 days of earlier negative activism against the same firm, or allegations outside this window that repeated earlier allegations. Reports, supra note 114.
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As the Figure shows, portfolios of governance-related negative activism
stocks do not generally perform well.154 This poor performance persists over the
long term—when we would expect governance reforms to materialize—as well
as the short term. The equal-weighted and value-weighted portfolios, as well as
the median company suffer consistent declines, all lose money over the short and
long terms.155
We discuss some implications of this puzzling result in Part IV. It is worth
noting that, because we do not observe corporate governance changes, it is possible that corporate governance at targeted firms is improving, even as share returns are declining. In addition, we observe anecdotally that negative activism is
sometimes associated with improved governance and performance.156 Take the
case of Herbalife. On December 19, 2012, Bill Ackman’s Pershing Square announced, over the course of a three-hour presentation, a $1 billion short position
in Herbalife, alleging the company’s operations constituted an illegal pyramid
scheme.157 The position provoked an opposite response from other activists, including Carl Icahn, who took the opposite bet and agreed with Herbalife to appoint two new directors to the company.158 Icahn would later note that he “believed the Company was in need of an activist and that certainly turned out to be
correct.”159 Herbalife weathered several agency investigations,160 settlements
with the FTC and SEC,161 and a shareholder class action suit,162 with Icahn’s
directors “work[ing] closely with management to stabilize the Company.”163 In
2021, Icahn exited the bulk of his position and relinquished his board seats,

154. See supra Figure 4.
155. The uptick in the value-weighted portfolio returns at the end of year four are principally due to volatility by Tesla in 2020. Two instances of negative activism targeted Tesla just over six months apart beginning
in 2016, making Tesla, a comparatively large company, an outsized influence on our value-weighted portfolio
returns in 2020, when Tesla stock exhibited significant growth amid large volatility.
156. See sources cited supra note 151.
157. See William Alden, Ackman Outlines Bet Against Herbalife, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK
(Dec. 20, 2012, 2:08 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/20/ackman-outlines-bet-against-herbalife/
[https://perma.cc/H9X4-FDVS]; Maureen Farrell, A Year in the Life of Ackman’s Billion Dollar Herbalife Bet,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 20, 2013, 5:53 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-MBB-13712 [https://perma.cc/YR332VG2].
158. Martinne Geller, Herbalife Gives Icahn Board Seats, Right to Boost Stake, REUTERS (Feb. 28, 2013,
2:41 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-herbalife-icahn/herbalife-gives-icahn-board-seats-right-to-booststake-idUSBRE91R1FN20130228 [https://perma.cc/3Y98-936W].
159. Carleton English, Carl Icahn Is Slashing Herbalife Stake, Says ‘Role as Activist Is Not Needed’,
BARRON’S (Jan. 4, 2021, 10:59 AM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/carl-icahn-cuts-herbalife-stake-as-roleas-activist-is-not-needed-51609775986 [https://perma.cc/PLH5-K6JK].
160. See, e.g., Richard Lee & Jason D. Schloetzer, The Activism of Carl Icahn and Bill Ackman, CONF. BD.
DIR. NOTES, May 2014, at 12.
161. Matthew Goldstein, Herbalife Settles with S.E.C., but Too Late for Hedge Fund Investor, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/27/business/herbalife-sec-ackman.html [https://perma.cc/
X94U-T4KM].
162. See Amended Class Action Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, In re Herbalife, Ltd. Sec. Litig., No.
2:14-CV-02850-DSF (C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2014).
163. Carl C. Icahn Issues Statement Regarding Herbalife Nutrition, CARL ICAHN (Aug. 12, 2020),
https://carlicahn.com/carl-c-icahn-issues-statement-regarding-herbalife-nutrition/
[https://perma.cc/PY4HY7KV].
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claiming his “role as an activist is not needed.”164 Perhaps thanks to Icahn’s influence and changes brought about by investigations and settlements, Herbalife’s
stock eventually recovered, earning Icahn returns of over $1 billion.165 But instances like this, where both positive and negative activists become significantly
involved, are comparatively rare.166
2.

Calendar-Time Analysis

Buy-and-hold returns are not the sole way to assess the long-term financial
impacts of negative activism.167 We also conduct calendar-time portfolio regressions as another means of assessing long-term returns to negative activism. This
approach, like the buy-and-hold abnormal return analysis, is a standard method
used to determine abnormal returns of firms that experience a particular event.168
Although the calendar-time approach may be less representative of the typical
investor’s experience, it carries important methodological advantages when
drawing empirical conclusions.169 We are interested in three distinct windows:
the three years leading up to the negative activism announcement to assess the
pre-activism performance of target companies; and the three- and five-year windows following the announcement, to assess post-activism long-term performance of target companies.
Methodologically, for our first window (the three years leading up to negative activism), each month from January 2006 (three years before our first negative activism event) through December 2020 (the last year of available data),
we construct equal-weighted and value-weighted portfolios of all firms that will
become the target of negative activism sometime within the next three years.
Each month we rebalance these portfolios, removing any companies that had
been targeted by negative activism and adding any new companies that have
moved within three years of being targeted. We then regress the excess monthly
portfolio returns on the standard three Fama-French factors, as well as the same
model plus a momentum factor, as follows:
(2)
𝑟# − 𝑟𝑓# = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑟𝑚𝑓# + 𝛽2 𝑠𝑚𝑏# + 𝛽3 ℎ𝑚𝑙# + 𝜀#
𝑟# − 𝑟𝑓# = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑟𝑚𝑓# + 𝛽2 𝑠𝑚𝑏# + 𝛽3 ℎ𝑚𝑙# + 𝛽4 𝑚𝑜𝑚# + 𝜀#

(3)

164. English, supra note 159.
165. See, e.g., Tae Kim, Carl Icahn Says He Made $1 Billion on Winning Herbalife Trade Against Ackman,
CNBC (Mar. 1, 2018, 2:07 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/01/carl-icahn-on-herbalife-win-over-ackman-ienjoy-a-good-fight-especially-when-i-win-it.html [https://perma.cc/8RHS-DBTE] (“On paper, I made a billion.”).
166. See Bliss, Molk & Partnoy, supra note 4, at 1379–93.
167. See John D. Lyon, Brad M. Barber & Chih-Ling Tsai, Improved Methods for Tests of Long-Run Abnormal Stock Returns, 54 J. FIN. 165, 165 (1999).
168. See id. at 166.
169. Among other things, the calendar-time approach better addresses model specification problems and
minimizes problems of abnormal return cross-correlation across targeted firms. See, e.g., Fama, supra note 122,
at 295–96.
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where 𝑟$ is the return of the (equal- or value-weighted) portfolio during month t,
𝑟𝑓$ is the risk-free rate during month t, 𝑟𝑚𝑓$ is the Fama-French excess market
rate of return over the risk free rate during month t, 𝑠𝑚𝑏$ is the Fama-French
small-minus-big return during month t, ℎ𝑚𝑙$ is the Fama-French high-minuslow return during month t, 𝑚𝑜𝑚$ is the Fama-French momentum factor during
month t, and 𝜀$ is an error term. We estimate our regressions using weighted least
squares, weighting by the number of portfolio firms in a given calendar month
to compensate for the increasing number of observations we have over time. We
then repeat this exercise for our remaining two windows, constructing monthly
portfolios from firms that have experienced negative activism sometime within
the past three or five years, respectively. As before, to avoid double-counting
targets that are targeted by repeated, related negative activism, we remove firmactivist allegations occurring within 180 days of earlier negative activism against
the same firm, or allegations outside this window that repeated earlier allegations.
Our variable of interest is 𝛼, which represents the portfolio’s average
monthly abnormal return over the relevant window. Our results are in Table 2.
As the table shows, the eventual targets of negative activism outperform the market during the three-year period leading up to negative activism.170 They then
significantly underperform the market during the three years following a negative activism event.171 The equal-weight portfolio outperforms the market by approximately 1% per month leading up to a negative activism event, after which
it lags competitors by approximately 0.75%.172 The value-weight portfolio modestly outperforms the market leading up to negative activism by a statistically
insignificant 0.2% per month, but then trails the market.173 These results are consistent with our buy-and-hold analysis, with a positive runup to negative activism, after which targets underperform the market.174

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

See infra Table 2.
See infra Table 2.
See infra Table 2.
See infra Table 2.
See infra Table 2.
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TABLE 2 CALENDAR-TIME REGRESSIONS, PRE- AND POST-NEGATIVE
ACTIVISM, 2009-2016
Equal-Weight
Window
(months)
[-36,-1]
[+1,+36]
[+1,+60]

Three-Factor
1.03**
(0.18)
-0.74***
(0.17)
-0.56***
(0.15)

Four-Factor +
Momentum
1.03***
(0.18)
-0.70***
(0.17)
-0.53***
(0.15)

Value-Weight
Three-Factor
0.19
(0.22)
-0.45**
(0.22)
-0.24*
(0.17)

Four-Factor +
Momentum
0.20
(0.22)
-0.38**
(0.22)
-0.19
(0.16)

Firmmonths
15,826
24,512
40,183

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
The [-36,-1] window includes 451 campaigns against 374 unique firms, and the [+1,+36] and [+1,+60]
windows include 683 campaigns against 571 unique firms.

As with our buy-and-hold analysis, we also inquire into the performance of
companies that are the target of corporate governance-related negative activism.
We repeat our calendar-time regressions on the subset of activism most closely
associated with potential corporate governance reform.175 The results are collected in Table 3. The results are similar for both the equal- and value-weight
portfolios, with the portfolio of governance-related negative activism outperforming the market by approximately 1.5% per month and then trailing the market by 0.75%-1% per month post-activism.176
TABLE 3: CALENDAR-TIME REGRESSIONS, PRE- AND POST-NEGATIVE
ACTIVISM, GOVERNANCE-RELATED ACTIVISM, 2009-2016
Equal-Weight
Window
(months)
[-36,-1]
[+1,+36]
[+1,+60]

Three-Factor
1.42***
(0.34)
-1.34***
(0.23)
-1.00***
(0.20)

Four-Factor +
Momentum
1.43***
(0.35)
-1.33***
(0.23)
-0.96***
(0.20)

Value-Weight
Three-Factor
1.35***
(0.33)
-1.13***
(0.42)
-0.86**
(0.37)

Four-Factor +
Momentum
1.43***
(0.33)
-1.06***
(0.43)
-0.95***
(0.38)

FirmMonths
5,926
10,244
16,791

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
The [-36,-1] window includes 171 campaigns against 145 unique firms, and the [+1,+36] and [+1,+60]
windows include 286 campaigns against 254 unique firms.

175. As before, the subset included all allegations categorized by Activist Shorts Research as involving
accounting fraud, ineffective roll-up, major business fraud, misleading accounting, pyramid scheme, stock promotion, and other illegal practices. The remaining categories that we did not include are bubble, competitive
pressures, forthcoming dividend cut, industry issues, medical effectiveness, other overvaluation, over-levered,
patent expiration, product ineffective, and upcoming earnings miss. Reports, supra note 114.
176. See infra Table 3.
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These results, consistent with our buy-and-hold analysis, belie the claim
that negative activism systematically leads to governance reform, at least as expressed in stock prices.177 The anecdotal success story instead seems a comparatively rare phenomenon.178 Instead, negative activism is consistently associated
with lower long-term returns, even when it targets governance failures.179
3.

Operational Performance

Finally, in addition to stock price performance, we study companies’ operational performance following a negative activism event. We mimic the leading
research study of the long-term effects of positive activism by studying the same
variables for negative activism: Tobin’s Q and return on assets.180 Both of these
variables are potentially flawed and pose the risk of statistical bias, but we make
the adjustments that are recommended when using ratios as dependent variables.181 We do not advocate the use of Tobin’s Q as a measure of operational
success, but we include an analysis of Tobin’s Q to maintain parallels to the literature on positive activism. Another reason we address Tobin’s Q is to demonstrate how results based on this variable are often not robust to changes in the
econometric specification.
Notwithstanding the problems associated with Tobin’s Q, its use remains
widespread as a measure of firm value and operational performance.182 The simplistic version of Tobin’s Q common in the literature is simply the ratio of a
firm’s market value to its book value;183 higher values of Tobin’s Q correspond
to higher market valuations for a given book value of assets, which some researchers assert reflects the market’s perceived operational superiority of that
company.184
In addition to Tobin’s Q, we also use “Total Q,” a ratio that Ryan Peters
and Lucian Taylor185 have suggested can correct some of the methodological
problems embodied in Tobin’s Q. Total Q also is problematic as a dependent

177. See supra Table 3.
178. See supra Table 3.
179. See Bliss, Molk & Partnoy, supra note 4, at 1393.
180. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 10, at 1101–03.
181. See Robert Bartlett & Frank Partnoy, The Ratio Problem, 23–31 (2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3605606 [https://perma.cc/KR4B-B7FQ] (describing appropriate fixes for regression analysis that uses a
ratio as a dependent variable).
182. See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Ronald J. Gilson & Darius Palia, Corporate Governance Changes as a Signal:
Contextualizing the Performance Link 2 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 323/2016, 2016);
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 900 n.150 (2005)
(noting Tobin’s Q is a “standard measure used by financial economists, as a proxy for firm value.”); see also
Robert Bartlett & Frank Partnoy, The Misuse of Tobin’s Q, 73 VAND. L. REV. 353, 357 (2020) (“More than three
hundred law review articles . . . have referenced Tobin’s q as a key measure of the value of corporations, as have
hundreds of articles in the most highly-regarded peer-reviewed finance and economics journals”) (internal citations omitted).
183. See, e.g., Bartlett & Partnoy, supra note 182, at 356.
184. See, e.g., Brav et al., supra note 10, at 1101.
185. Ryan H. Peters & Lucian A. Taylor, Intangible Capital and the Investment-q Relation, 123 J. FIN.
ECON. 251, 252 (2017).
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variable, but we include it as a robustness check.186 Total Q is available through
only calendar year 2017,187 so our number of observations is lower than for the
other analyses, and our results will be biased towards the beginning of our sample
for late-period post-activism performance estimates.
Finally, we examine return on assets, or ROA. ROA is calculated as the
ratio of a firm’s earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization to
the firm’s book value. ROA has been used as a proxy for operational performance in several studies188 although, like our other two measures, it too is not
without its limitations.189
We calculate annual values for Tobin’s Q, Total Q, and ROA using data
from Compustat.190 We winsorize these numbers at the 1% and 99% sample levels to correct for outlier values, and we conduct linear regressions to estimate
annual impacts on these variables of target companies from the target year (t)
through the following four years (t+4), which exhausts the time period of data
available from Compustat.191 The results are collected in Table 4. Our dynamic
panel dataset regressions include a variety of model-specific controls identified
in the Table, as well as firm age,192 the log of firm market value, calendar year
dummy variables, dummy variables for each of the three years preceding activism, and the inverse of the independent variables’ denominator to correct for
omitted variable bias.193 This last correction is an important one that is often
neglected in studies that use ratios as dependent variables.194 In unreported results, we find that omitting this inverse variable improves the statistical significance of our point estimates, although the estimates themselves remain largely
unchanged.195

186. See, e.g., id. at 268; Bartlett & Partnoy, supra note 182, at 360 n.20.
187. Wharton Research Data Services, WHARTON UNIV. PA., https://wrds-www.wharton.upenn.edu/ (last
visited Nov. 22, 2021) [https://perma.cc/M76J-RJTX].
188. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Charles C.Y. Wang., Learning and the Disappearing Association Between Governance and Returns, 108 J. FIN. ECON. 323 (2013).
189. In particular, operational changes that do not affect a company’s earnings will not affect ROA.
190. Wharton Research Data Services, supra note 191.
191. Because our negative activism events occur through the end of calendar year 2016, we can estimate up
to four years of following operational performance using data available through 2020.
192. We obtain a firm’s founding year from Jay Ritter’s database. Jay R. Ritter, IPO Data, WARRINGOTN
COLL. BUS., (Nov. 12, 2021), https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/ [https://perma.cc/8YEC-6JJE]. His
process for determining dates is described in Tim Loughran & Jay Ritter, Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed
Over Time?, FIN. MGMT. 5, app. A (2004). When a firm cannot be matched to an entry in the database, we use
eight years before the firm’s Compustat-listed IPO year, which is the median date from Ritter’s database. See,
e.g., Peters & Taylor, supra note 185, at 271.
193. For additional discussion of this problem, see Bartlett & Partnoy, supra note 185, at 23–31.
194. See id. at 4.
195. See infra Table 4.
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TABLE 4: FIRM OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE
POST-EVENT, ALL ACTIVISM
Table 4
Firm Operational Performance Post-Event, All Activism
(1)
t -3
t -2
t -1
t : Event Year
t +1
t +2
t +3
t +4
Year FE
NAICS FE
Firm FE
Obs.

(2)

(3)

(4)

ROA

Dependent Variable
-0.051
(0.048)
-0.050
(0.039)
-0.074**
(0.034)
-0.048*
(0.025)
-0.065**
(0.025)
-0.089***
(0.023)
-0.076***
(0.020)
-0.087***
(0.026)
54,360

-0.076
-0.053
(0.049) (0.047)
-0.049
-0.025
(0.040) (0.037)
-0.058*
-0.041
(0.035) (0.034)
-0.028
-0.012
(0.025) (0.025)
-0.034
-0.024
(0.025) (0.025)
-0.054** -0.046**
(0.023) (0.023)
-0.038*
-0.033
(0.021) (0.020)
-0.047* -0.046*
(0.027) (0.027)
Y
Y
Y
54,360
54,350

-0.006
(0.038)
0.024
(0.038)
0.010
(0.048)
0.043
(0.038)
0.034
(0.036)
0.016
(0.027)
0.034
(0.029)
0.016
(0.036)
Y
Y
54,360

(5)

(6)
(7)
(Simple) Tobin's Q

3.526
3.292
(2.158) (2.145)
1.357*
0.931
(0.780) (0.787)
2.307*** 1.879**
(0.831) (0.838)
1.259**
0.768
(0.579) (0.589)
1.833**
1.299
(0.879) (0.881)
1.158
0.800
(0.777) (0.781)
0.596*
0.420
(0.353) (0.369)
-0.026
-0.166
(0.344) (0.362)
Y
53,673
53,673

(8)

(9)

3.010
1.816
0.587
(2.176) (1.852)
(1.049)
0.632
-0.540
0.380
(0.827) (0.589)
(0.587)
1.618*
0.345
0.561
(0.875) (0.796)
(0.462)
0.533
-0.636
-0.003
(0.641) (0.546)
(0.389)
1.101
-0.081 -0.927***
(0.920) (0.762)
(0.271)
0.627
-0.774 -1.118***
(0.829) (0.616)
(0.258)
0.290 -1.337*** -1.112***
(0.392) (0.364)
(0.279)
-0.214
-0.587 -1.325***
(0.342) (0.564)
(0.358)
Y
Y
Y
Y
53,663
53,673
39,604

(10)

(11)

(12)

0.668
(1.039)
0.203
(0.608)
0.418
(0.488)
-0.171
(0.413)
-1.228***
(0.323)
-1.414***
(0.335)
-1.186***
(0.378)
-1.349***
(0.476)
Y
Y
39,597

0.454
(0.606)
0.001
(0.315)
0.033
(0.375)
-0.529
(0.395)
-0.697
(0.424)
-0.737*
(0.429)
-0.961*
(0.511)
-0.671
(0.637)
Y
Y
39,604

Total Q
0.463
(1.054)
-0.059
(0.611)
0.046
(0.492)
-0.537
(0.416)
-1.416***
(0.299)
-1.585***
(0.289)
-1.446***
(0.315)
-1.725***
(0.393)
Y
39,604

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the firm level. All models include the log of market

*value,
significant
atfirm's
10%**
significant
***variable's
significant
at 1%.
Robust standard
the log of the
age, and
the inverse of at
the 5%;
dependent
denominator
as independent
variables. errors in parentheses and clustered at
the firm level. All models include the log of market value, the log of the firm's age, and the inverse of the dependent
variable's denominator as independent variables.

As Table 4 shows, for all models involving ROA and Total Q, estimates of
firm operational performance in every year following negative activism are significantly negative or else lack statistical significance.196 Estimates for Tobin’s
Q are positive for the simplest models, but these estimates reverse once certain
controls are included.197 In addition, estimates of performance during the years
leading up to negative activism are generally positive. Consistent with our stock
price performance findings, it appears that negative activism targets outperform
before negative activism, and then underperform in the short- and long-term
post-activism.198
We then repeat the analysis for the subset of firms targeted by negative
activism most closely associated with the potential for corporate governance improvements.199 Table 5 contains the results. The picture is similar to that for our
entire sample: most estimates for negative activism’s effects on operational performance are negative in the short- and long-term, although some of the results
lack statistical significance and the performance pre-activism is more mixed.200

196. See supra Table 4.
197. See supra Table 4. The divergence between the estimates with Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable
and our other estimates provides additional support for distrusting Tobin’s Q as a reliable measure of operational
performance.
198. See supra Table 4.
199. See infra Table 5. As before, the subset included all allegations categorized by Activist Shorts Research as involving accounting fraud, ineffective roll-up, major business fraud, misleading accounting, pyramid
scheme, stock promotion, and other illegal practices. The remaining categories that we did not include are bubble,
competitive pressures, forthcoming dividend cut, industry issues, medical effectiveness, other overvaluation,
over-levered, patent expiration, product ineffective, and upcoming earnings miss.
200. See infra Table 5.
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It appears, however, that firms overall do not on emerge from negative activism
stronger than before.201
TABLE 5: FIRM OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE POST-EVENT,
5
GOVERNANCE-RTable
ELATED
ACTIVISM
Firm Operational Performance Post-Event, Governance-Related Activism
(1)
Dependent Variable
t -3
t -2
t -1
t : Event Year
t +1
t +2
t +3
t +4
Year FE
NAICS FE
Firm FE
Obs.

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

ROA
-0.939** -1.124** -1.136**
(0.084) (0.084) (0.084)
0.053*
0.053*
0.057*
(0.032) (0.032) (0.031)
-0.047
-0.036
-0.039
(0.081) (0.081) (0.080)
-0.024
-0.002
0.000
(0.064) (0.064) (0.063)
-0.049
-0.013
-0.012
(0.065) (0.064) (0.064)
-0.015
0.025
0.013
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026)
-0.012
0.026
0.008
(0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
0.010
0.051
0.039
(0.037) (0.038) (0.040)
Y
Y
Y
54,380
54,380
54,370

-0.056
(0.079)
0.031
(0.048)
-0.058
(0.111)
-0.018
(0.092)
-0.015
(0.090)
0.010
(0.039)
0.013
(0.036)
0.009
(0.052)
Y
Y
54,380

2.063
(2.204)
-0.402
(0.362)
2.071
(1.405)
0.294
(0.360)
1.619
(1.559)
-0.337
(0.334)
-0.202
(0.433)
-0.524
(0.375)
53,673

(6)
(7)
(Simple) Tobin's Q
1.734
(2.196)
-0.755*
(0.393)
1.615
(1.412)
-0.287
(0.387)
1.041
(1.554)
-0.644*
(0.361)
-0.376
(0.450)
-0.697*
(0.395)
Y
53,673

1.627
(2.186)
-0.907**
(0.407)
1.476
(1.408)
-0.461
(0.397)
0.867
(1.553)
-0.727*
(0.381)
-0.392
(0.450)
-0.737*
(0.432)
Y
Y
53,663

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

Total Q
1.414
(2.007)
-1.264**
(0.575)
0.713
(1.472)
-0.946***
(0.360)
0.214
(1.484)
-1.413***
(0.547)
-1.187**
(0.473)
-0.744
(0.593)
Y
Y
53,673

0.001
(0.414)
-0.599
(0.413)
-0.058
(0.386)
-0.936***
(0.318)
-1.056***
(0.329)
-1.273***
(0.336)
-1.107**
(0.449)
-0.728
(0.688)
39,604

-1.124** -1.136**
(0.474)
(0.579)
-1.014**
-0.918
(0.466)
(0.559)
-0.535
-0.275
(0.431)
(0.503)
-1.494*** -1.309***
(0.361)
(0.453)
-1.580*** -1.846***
(0.363)
(0.518)
-1.803*** -1.941***
(0.375)
(0.590)
-1.455*** -1.744**
(0.499)
(0.693)
-1.013
-1.215*
(0.757)
(0.723)
Y
Y
Y
39,604
39,597

-0.056
(0.458)
0.096
(0.502)
0.254
(0.507)
-0.508
(0.443)
-0.785*
(0.467)
-0.544
(0.411)
-0.742
(0.556)
-0.231
(0.446)
Y
Y
39,604

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the firm level. All models include the log of market

*significant
at firm's
10%;
at dependent
5%; ***variable's
significant
at 1%.
Robust variables.
standard errors in parentheses and clustered at
value, the log of the
age,**
andsignificant
the inverse of the
denominator
as independent
the firm level. All models include the log of market value, the log of the firm’s age, and the inverse of the dependent
variable’s denominator as independent variables.

B.

Class Actions

We now move beyond a study of negative activism’s impact on company
financial performance. Our first field of examination is class action lawsuits. Anecdotal evidence has suggested that short sellers may expose the type of conduct
that plaintiffs’ attorneys then use to bring class action lawsuits.202 Here, we seek
a richer understanding of the potential link between negative activism and such
lawsuits.
To do so, we first needed to determine which negative activism reports in
our database were associated with class action lawsuits. With the aid of research
assistants, we searched the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse,
Lexis Securities Mosaic, Factiva, and the major legal case and docket databases
for class actions involving our targets of negative activism.203 We then individually reviewed the complaints in the class action lawsuits, comparing them to the
201. See infra Table 5.
202. See, e.g., Nessim Mezrahi, Guest Post: Funder, Short-Seller Use Undermines Securities Class Actions,
D&O DIARY (Aug. 31, 2020), https://www.dandodiary.com/2020/08/articles/securities-litigation/guest-post-funder-short-seller-use-undermines-securities-class-actions/ [https://perma.cc/C2U6-DX93]; Joshua Mitts, Short
Sellers and Plaintiffs’ Firms: A Symbiotic Ecosystem, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Oct. 14, 2020), https://clsbluesky.
law.columbia.edu/2020/10/14/short-sellers-and-plaintiffs-firms-a-symbiotic-ecosystem/
[https://perma.cc/XTZ7-FK75].
203. See, e.g., Securities Class Action Clearinghouse: A Collaboration with Cornerstone Research, STAN.
L. SCH., https://securities.stanford.edu/filings.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2021) [https://perma.cc/6TTN-BG8E];
Lexis Securities Mosaic, LEXISNEXIS, https://www.lexissecuritiesmosaic.com/net/SMUSERMANAGER/
login.aspx?ReturnUrl=%2fnet%2fhome%2fkmhome.aspx(last visited Nov. 19, 2021) [https://perma.cc/5E8PQJ6N]; Factiva, DOW JONES, https://www.dowjones.com/professional/factiva/ [https://perma.cc/6RZW-6LKR].
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allegations made by the negative activists, and ascertained when we could determine that the class actions directly relied upon the negative activist’s efforts.204
The class action lawsuit filed against China Valves Technology is illustrative. China Valves, a company involved in developing, manufacturing, and selling metal valves,205 was accused in a report by Citron Research of engaging in
several acquisitions with undisclosed related parties.206 The stock price dropped
18% on the day the report was issued, January 13, 2011.207 The stock price was
still depressed by the time a class action was filed by The Rosen Law Firm on
February 4, 2011.208
The complaint relied heavily on the Citron report, with the bulk of seven
pages of the complaint quoting the report directly.209 The complaint’s substantive allegations concluded, “When these adverse details contained in the Citron
Report entered began to enter [sic] the market, the price of China Valves stock
fell, damaging investors.”210
Similar complaints were filed by other parties, with the complaints eventually consolidated into a single action on June 29, 2011.211 That consolidated complaint was dismissed and later amended; on October 21, 2013, the court rejected
defendants’ motion to dismiss and several counts survived.212 Soon after the parties agreed to a settlement in which the defendants agreed to pay $1.5 million to
settle the claims without admitting to any of the allegations in the complaint.213
The settlement was ultimately approved on September 29, 2014,214 ending the
private class action.215

204. In most instances, the complaint directly cited the negative activist’s allegations, although some complaints referred to the substance of the allegations without identifying the negative activist.
205. Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws at 3, Foster et al. v. China Valves
Tech., Inc., 979 F. Supp. 2d 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 1:11-cv-00796), 2011 WL 613631.
206. China Valves Technology (NASDAQ: CVVT) Destined to Get Delisted, CITRON RSCH., https://citronresearch.com/china-valve-technology-nasdaqcvvt-destined-to-get-delisted/(last visited Nov. 22, 2021) [https://
perma.cc/Z9H9-MWTJ].
207. Analysis of CRSP data. See Data Access Tools, CTR. RSCH. SEC. PRICES, http://www.crsp.org/products/software-access-tools (last visited Nov. 22, 2021) [https://perma.cc/9GKJ-PJ3Z].
208. See Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws, supra note 209 (citing to
filing date). Based on our analysis of CRSP data, the stock closed at $7.15 per share on the Citron report, and
$7.19 per share when the class action was filed (down 3% from the prior day’s close).
209. Id. at 11–12, 16–20.
210. Id. at 20.
211. Order at 1, Foster et al. v. China Valves Tech. Inc., 979 F. Supp. 2d 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 1:11cv-00796).
212. In re China Valves Tech. Sec. Litig., 979 F. Supp. 2d 395, 405–17 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
213. Notice of Pendency and Proposed Settlement of Class Action at 1, In re China Valves Tech. Sec. Litig.,
979 F. Supp. 2d 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
214. Order and Final Judgment at 7, In re China Valves Tech. Sec. Litig., 979 F. Supp. 2d 395 (S.D.N.Y.
2013); Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement with China Valves Technology Inc. and Its Officers and Directors, In re China Valves Tech. Sec. Litig., 979 F. Supp. 2d 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). Modest awards were also made
to the lead plaintiffs of $3,500 and $1,500.
215. The SEC also obtained a settlement against the company, its chairman, and its CFO. SEC Obtains
Final Judgments Against China Valves Technology, Inc. and Two Senior Officers in Fraud Case, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2015/lr23266.htm [https://perma.cc/26B3-GDJE].
We discuss regulatory actions in Section III.C.
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In all, we identified eighty-four class actions that directly relied upon negative activists’ efforts. Unsurprisingly, none of the suits went to a jury verdict;
all ended in a settlement or some sort of dismissal. For purposes of presenting
empirical findings, we focused on the financial amounts of the class settlement,
ignoring other effects like governance improvements, deterrence, or case law
changes that are difficult to quantify,216 or opt-out settlements with institutional
or other investors. Figures A2 and A3 in the Appendix provide the interested
reader with detail on settlement amount distributions.217
For each class action, we collected the first complaint’s filing date as well
as the filing date of the first consolidated complaint, if any. Using this information, we studied the cumulative abnormal returns of target companies surrounding the filing dates. We regress excess daily firm-level returns on the standard three Fama-French factors, as well as the same model plus a momentum
factor, as follows:
(4)
𝑟!,# − 𝑟𝑓# = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑟𝑚𝑓# + 𝛽2 𝑠𝑚𝑏# + 𝛽3 ℎ𝑚𝑙# + 𝜀#
𝑟!,# − 𝑟𝑓# = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑟𝑚𝑓# + 𝛽2 𝑠𝑚𝑏# + 𝛽3 ℎ𝑚𝑙# + 𝛽4 𝑚𝑜𝑚# + 𝜀#

(5)

where 𝑟!,$ is the return of firm i on day t and all other variables are as defined in
Equations (3) and (4) above. We estimated the cumulative abnormal returns over
three windows that varied the number of trading days before and after the negative activist’s announcement.
Table 6 provides the cumulative abnormal return estimates for the windows
surrounding the filing of the initial class action. As the Table reveals, the filing
of class-action lawsuits is accompanied by dramatic, statistically significant declines in stock prices across all our specifications.218

216. For example, one case resulted in an opinion by the United States Supreme Court concerning whether
the equitable tolling rule applies to bringing successive class actions. China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh, 138 S. Ct.
1800, 1808–11 (2018).
217. See infra Figure A2. We exclude from our analysis uncontested actions that resulted in inflated default
judgments against companies.
218. See infra Table 6. Table A2 in the Appendix provides similar information for the filing of consolidated
class actions which, as expected, lacked statistical significance.
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TABLE 6 CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS, FIRST FILING OF CLASS
ACTION
Panel A: Fama-French Three Factor
Holding Period (in days)
[-1,1]
[-3,3]
[-10,1]
Average
-5.18%***
-13.77%***
-22.03%***
Median
-2.49%
-9.29%
-17.60%
Standard Deviation
(1.95)
(2.29)
(2.77)
Events
84
84
84

Panel B: Fama-French Four Factor
Holding Period (in days)
[-1,1]
[-3,3]
[-10,1]
Average
-5.19%***
-13.84%***
-22.10%***
Median
-2.40%
-9.49%
-17.66%
Standard Deviation
(1.94)
(2.30)
(2.75)
Events
84
84
84
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard
errors in parentheses.

Because of the close proximity between some negative activism events and
subsequent class action filings, our cumulative abnormal returns for longer holding periods may reflect some of the drops due to negative activism rather than
exclusively class action filing. Our [-1, 1] holding period cumulative abnormal
return may therefore be the best estimate of solely class action lawsuits’ impact
on security prices. We show in the Appendix, however, that the results are qualitatively the same if we repeat our estimates while excluding class actions that
were filed within ten days of negative activism.219 In addition, because of this
potential for overlap between negative activism effects and subsequently-filed
class action effects, we relegate to the Appendix our findings of long-term BHAR
for class action targets.220 The findings are similar to those found for announcements of negative activism, showing short- and long-term underperformance.221
Table 6’s stock price drops at the time of initial filing are striking,222 and it
is natural to question their cause. We could imagine class-action lawsuits could
produce negative company responses for two reasons. One would be because of
the costs companies must bear in defending these suits. Some of the costs will be
covered by D&O insurance, but any expected uninsured amounts, and any

219. See infra Appendix.
220. See infra Figure A4.
221. See infra Figure A4.
222. See supra Table 6. We note that, in theory, law firms, or associated hedge funds or individuals, could
fund these lawsuits by selling short shares of companies before suing them. The largest financial returns would
accrue to law firms that best file suits that reduce company values. Such financial incentives would exist whether
the reductions in value are due to burdens imposed on the company, as with undesirable meritless litigation, or
to desirable credible signals to the market about future firm performance.
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expected decreases in productivity as executives defend suits instead of run companies, are costs that could be incorporated into stock price drops.223
We might also expect negative stock price reactions to class action filings
because the filings may present new, negative information to investors about a
company’s future earning potential. The information underlying the class action
is public by the time the lawsuit is filed.224 However, the fact that a lawsuit is
filed, and a law firm therefore attaches sufficient credence to the negative activism allegations to invest in the suit, is itself new information about the importance of the underlying information that may suppress stock prices.
To capture how the strength of these two effects differ by law firm, we
calculate how stock price returns varied by the law firms that file the first complaint. We do this by first extracting the law firms named in the initial complaint
for each class action, and then repeating our cumulative abnormal return analysis
of Equation (5) above. When more than one firm is involved in the initial complaint, we count each of them, which results in including some individual class
actions more than once (although only once for any particular law firm).
Table 7 contains the results for law firms involved in three or more initial
class action filings.225 We sort the results by the cumulative abnormal returns
over the [-1, +1] window.226 All the law firms in the Table are associated with
negative average cumulative abnormal returns, although there is considerable
variability across firms and within firms across class actions.227

223. For caselaw developing how companies should balance these costs, see Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880,
892–93 (2d Cir. 1982).
224. See, e.g., China Valves Technology (NASDAQ: CVVT) Destined to Get Delisted, supra note 206.
225. See infra Table 7.
226. See infra Table 7. As discussed above, because of the potential overlap between negative activism
effects and class action filing effects when class actions are filed soon after activism, the [-1, +1] window may
best reflect any law firm-specific effects.
227. See infra Table 7.
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TABLE 7 CLASS ACTION CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS, BY LAW
FIRM
Window
Obs.

[-1,+1]
Average
Median

[-3,+3]
Average
Median

[-10,+1]
Average
Median

Robbins Geller
Rudman & Dowd

-14.57%

-8.48%

-16.76%

-20.17%

-27.56%

-33.49%

7

Rosen

-5.54%

-0.50%

-17.36%

-12.93%

-23.48%

-18.35%

36

Pomerantz

-4.56%

-4.63%

-12.12%

-9.60%

-21.05%

-17.71%

19

Holzer & Holzer

-2.90%

-0.13%

-2.17%

0.43%

-27.55%

-18.31%

4

Saxena White

-2.49%

-2.43%

-10.39%

-6.82%

-18.59%

-19.83%

4

Block & Leviton

-0.22%

0.30%

-6.62%

-5.04%

-13.77%

-22.49%

4

Glancy Prongay &
Murray

-0.19%

-0.21%

-9.75%

-7.70%

-25.35%

-12.90%

11

Howard G. Smith

3.06%

6.62%

-4.24%

-10.02%

-21.15%

-12.90%

3

Overall

-5.19%

-2.40%

-13.84%

-9.49%

-22.10%

-17.66%

84

Firm

Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated using the three factor Fama French method plus momentum. Law firms with
fewer than three observations are not broken out separately. Suits involving delisted firms for which price information is not
available are excluded. Suits involving Glancy Prongay & Murray, Glancy Binkow & Goldberg, and Goldberg Law are
combined.

Of course, not all class actions end in success for plaintiffs. Indeed, a robust
literature bemoans the opportunistic nature of some suits, which seemingly target
companies only to extract favorable settlements (often at insurers’ success) with
little attention paid to merit.228 Some of our observed settlements provide support
for this concern, specifying, for instance, that agreed-upon settlement proceeds
would be payable only out of the target company’s D&O policies,229 allowing
the target to dispose of a class action with no direct financial cost.
To attempt to assess this problem of meritless class actions, we examine
our eighty-four class actions that are linked to negative activism to determine
which plaintiffs’ law firms had the highest rates of no recovery.230 We also
tracked whether the class actions were voluntarily dismissed by plaintiffs. Table
8 contains the results for firms that participated in at least three initial class action
filings.231 As the Table reveals, some of the most active law firms had high rates
with no financial recovery.232 Pomerantz, for example, was the second-most active law firm, and nearly three-quarters of those suits ended with no recovery.233
228. See generally Stephen J. Choi, Jessica Erickson & A. C. Pritchard, Working Hard or Making Work?
Plaintiffs’ Attorney Fees in Securities Fraud Class Actions, 17 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 438 (2020).
229. See, e.g., Stipulation of Settlement at 11, In re A-Power Energy Generation Sys., Ltd. Sec. Litig. 11
(Jan. 9, 2013) (No. 2:11-ml-2302), 2012 WL 1983341.
230. Recoveries were zero if the case was dismissed or if it was voluntarily withdrawn.
231. See infra Table 8. The number of suits is higher for some firms in Table 6 than Table 5, because Table
5 required the target of negative activism to still be publicly listed to obtain stock prices. See supra Tables 5, 6.
232. See infra Table 8.
233. See infra Table 8.
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Even the most successful major law firm, Rosen, had 35% of its cases end with
no recovery.234 In all, 40% of cases concluded with no financial recovery.235
Plaintiffs’ law firms do, however, seem to have a good sense for predicting when
their cases will not end well for them. Voluntary dismissal rates accounted, on
average, for one-third of cases with no financial recovery, with rates slightly
higher among most of the major players.236
TABLE 8 LAW FIRM NON-RECOVERY RATES
Total Suits

Suits with No
Recovery

Voluntary
Dismissals

Nonrecovery
Rate

Pomerantz

19

14

5

74%

Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd

8

4

1

50%

Glancy Prongay & Murray

12

5

2

42%

Rosen

43

15

5

35%

Saxena White

4

1

1

25%

Holzer & Holzer

4

1

0

25%

Block & Leviton

4

0

0

0%

Howard G. Smith

3

0

0

0%

Overall

92

38

13

41%

Firm

Law firms with fewer than three observations are not broken out separately. Suits involving Glancy Prongay & Murray,
Glancy Binkow & Goldberg, and Goldberg Law are combined.

Given this variance in recovery rates, we should also expect variance in
recovery amounts. Table 9 shows the average, standard deviation, and median
settlement amounts for suits initially filed by named law firms.237 Unsurprisingly, the amounts vary widely across firms. Robbins Geller, for example, has
one of the higher nonrecovery rates, yet its average recovery significantly exceeds the average recoveries by other firms, thanks to its participation in the large
Valeant Pharmaceuticals class action that settled for $1.2 billion.238 The results
also vary considerably within firms, with six of our eight law firms having settlement standard deviations that exceed their average, and one having median
settlement amounts of $0.239

234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

See infra Table 8.
See infra Table 8.
See infra Table 8.
See infra Table 9.
See infra Table 9.
See infra Table 9.
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TABLE 9 LAW FIRM SETTLEMENT AMOUNTS
Average
Settlement

Std. Deviation
Settlement

Median
Settlement

Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd

$154,000,000

$427,000,000

$1,000,000

Howard G. Smith

$88,000,000

$132,000,000

$19,000,000

Glancy Prongay & Murray

$25,000,000

$68,000,000

$2,000,000

Block & Leviton

$18,000,000

$9,000,000

$20,000,000

Holzer & Holzer

$14,000,000

$17,000,000

$9,000,000

Pomerantz

$4,000,000

$10,000,000

$0

Rosen

$3,000,000

$4,000,000

$2,000,000

Saxena White

$3,000,000

$3,000,000

$2,000,000

Overall

$21,000,000

$128,000,000

$2,000,000

Firm

Law firms with fewer than three observations are not broken out separately. Suits involving Glancy
Prongay & Murray, Glancy Binkow & Goldberg, and Goldberg Law are combined.

Finally, we use our class action data to provide a glimpse into the prevalence of stock price-driven securities class-action litigation. Firms, industry players, and some academics have decried the perceived increase in this type of securities litigation, where plaintiffs’ law firms observe share price drops and then
reverse-engineer a basis to sue for securities fraud, resulting in what critics say
are cases based on specious arguments and low merit.240 The Supreme Court has
granted certiorari to hear a central issue in these securities class actions,
“[w]hether a defendant in a securities class action may rebut a presumption of
classwide reliance . . . by pointing to the generic nature of the alleged misstatements in showing that the statements had no impact on the price of the security . . . .”241 Yet despite this focus on this practice, and the potentially high costs
for companies and their insurers, price-driven securities litigation premised on
stock price drops, rather than underlying facts, has been the topic of anecdotal
evidence, rather than systematic study.242
Our dataset of negative activism affords the opportunity for more systematic study. If the practice is widespread, then we would expect most of our
240. See, e.g., Kevin LaCroix, Zoom Hit with Securities Suit Raising Pandemic-Linked Allegations Based
on Privacy Concerns, D&O DIARY (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.dandodiary.com/2020/04/articles/securities-litigation/zoom-hit-with-securities-suit-raising-pandemic-linked-allegations-based-on-privacy-concerns/
[https://perma.cc/LH8Q-HUFD]; Reed & Lloyd, supra note 59; Client Alert: The New Wave of Securities Class
Action Litigation—Mismanagement of Corporate Events Can Create Vulnerability, AON (Apr. 2019),
https://www.aon.com/getmedia/c071e33d-8469-492f-976c-b9d4378c453c/Aon-April-2019-Event-LitigationApril-Client-Alert.aspx [https://perma.cc/E3HY-ZJWH]; Alexander I. Platt, “Gatekeeping” in the Dark: SEC
Control over Private Securities Litigation Revisited, 72 ADMIN. L. REV. 27, 78 n.259 (2020).
241. Petition for A Writ of Certiorari at 1, Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. v. Ark. Teacher Retirement Sys. et al.,
141 S.Ct. 1951 (2021) (No. 20-222).
242. Cf. Reed & Lloyd, supra note 59, at 2 (discussing “[e]vent-driven securities” cases filed after company
stock prices drop).
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activism announcements that are associated with immediate stock price drops to
be accompanied by subsequent class actions.
To analyze the issue, we first make some important assumptions that we
believe, collectively, will tend to overstate the prevalence of perceived securities
class-action litigation. To avoid double-counting activism announcements, we
aggregate into a single announcement any activism against the same target within
180 calendar days, or activism beyond this window that make the same substantive allegations. If the first-filed or consolidated complaint refers to any of the
individual disclosures, then we code the aggregated disclosure as being connected with litigation. Finally, we assign the aggregated disclosure a cumulative
abnormal return equal to the minimum return associated with the individual disclosures. Having made these assumptions, we analyze the relationship between
activism-linked class actions and initial stock price declines.
Table 10 shows the relationship between activism-linked class actions and
initial stock price declines.243 We provide results that vary across two dimensions: the CAR window and the CAR threshold. A CAR threshold of -20%, for
example, means that an activism disclosure (and any linked class action) must be
associated with a CAR of at least -20%.
TABLE 10 PERCENT OF NEGATIVE ACTIVISM ASSOCIATED WITH CLASS
ACTIONS
CAR Window
CAR
Threshold

[-1, 1]

[-3, 3]

[-10, 1]

-20%

44%

37%

37%

-15%

39%

38%

32%

-10%

32%

31%

28%

-5%

25%

24%

24%

-1%

19%

20%

20%

CAR threshold denotes the maximum allowable CAR for
inclusion in our analysis.

To some degree, our results are consistent with criticism of securities litigation as lacking merit. As we reduce our CAR threshold, a higher percentage of
negative activism is linked to class actions, suggesting that steeper stock price
declines are more associated with litigation.244
However, we find the comparatively low numbers, particularly for higher
CAR thresholds, somewhat inconsistent with the critique of stock price-driven
securities litigation. Under half of negative activist reports correlated with 20%
declines are associated with class actions that rely on the reports, and only a
243.
244.

See infra Table 10.
See supra Table 10.
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quarter of disclosures with 5% declines result in reliant class actions.245 Our results thus confirm the existence of stock price-driven litigation, but one might
have expected these numbers to be significantly higher, particularly given the
ease in reverse engineering securities fraud arguments from stock price declines,
and the comparatively low barriers to filing class actions.246 Moreover, plaintiffs’
lawyers are more likely to file cases associated with negative activism when the
economic losses to shareholders are greater in percentage terms, rather than
merely bringing suit any time they observe a decline that exceeds a predetermined profitability threshold.247
A final area we analyze with respect to securities class action litigation is
the type of lead plaintiff. Given the granular nature of our data, we are able to
contribute to the debate about institutional versus individual lead plaintiffs in
securities class actions, a literature that has found that settlements are higher in
cases that have institutions as lead plaintiffs.248 We hand collect the names of the
lead plaintiffs in each case linked to negative activism,249 categorizing the names
as representing either institutions or individuals, and then match these names
with the resolution of the litigation, either dismissal or settlement.250 We then
assess the relative success of securities class action litigation with the presence
of institutional versus individual lead plaintiffs.
Our main conclusion here is that the resolution of securities class action
litigation is on average more favorable when the lead plaintiff is an institution as
contrasted to an individual. We also find virtually no overlap among lead plaintiffs in our sample, meaning that there appear to be no repeat-player “professional” plaintiffs for negative activism-related securities class actions and that
“pay for play” appears to be unlikely in this subset of securities class action litigation.251 Any concerns about professional plaintiffs appear to be unwarranted
with respect to securities litigation that follows negative activism.
245. See supra Table 10.
246. See Reed & Lloyd, supra note 59, at 3.
247. See id. at 2.
248. Evidence regarding the impact of the type of plaintiff in securities class actions is mixed, though empirical analysis suggests that the presence of an institutional investor as lead plaintiff is associated with higher
settlement values. See, e.g., James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1587–88 (2006) (finding higher
settlement amounts when institutions are present as lead plaintiffs). There also is evidence that, even after correcting for self-selection, the presence of pension funds specifically is associated with higher settlement amounts.
See Michael Perino, Institutional Activism Through Litigation: An Empirical Analysis of Public Pension Fund
Participation in Securities Class Actions, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 368, 369 (2012) (finding that cases with
public pension funds as lead plaintiffs have higher recoveries).
249. Consistent with the securities class action litigation literature, we are focused on, and report here, our
analysis of the lead plaintiffs. We also collect the names of the initial plaintiff in each case, as well as named
plaintiffs that are added during the litigation. The initial plaintiffs and named plaintiffs are composed primarily
of individuals, with a handful of pension funds and other investment vehicles. None of the cases featured the
negative activist as either an initial or a lead plaintiff; instead, all plaintiffs relied on the negative activist’s efforts.
For more on the potential for short sellers as lead plaintiffs, see generally Christine Hurt & Paul Stancil, Short
Sellers, Short Squeezes, and Securities Fraud, 47 J. CORP. L. (forthcoming).
250. No cases in our sample went to trial.
251. The only individual name present in more than one case was the lead plaintiff in two related cases. For
an analysis of repeat players and the “pay-to-play” issue, see Cox & Thomas, supra note 252, at 1611–15.
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Of our ninety-four cases with information on lead plaintiffs, thirty-eight
had zero settlement amounts.252 The relative breakdown of institutional versus
individual plaintiffs is set forth in Table 11, below:
TABLE 11 LEAD PLAINTIFF AND CLASS ACTION RECOVERY
All Cases
Zero Settlement
Non-Zero Settlement

All
94
38
56

Plaintiff Type
Institutional
32
10
22

Individual
62
28
34

% Institutional
34%
26%
39%

With respect to the thirty-eight cases in our sample with zero settlement
amounts, which included dismissed cases with no settlement, there were ten institutional lead plaintiffs, or approximately 26%.253 With respect to the cases
with a non-zero settlement amount, including cases that were dismissed, there
were twenty-two institutional lead plaintiffs, or approximately 39%.254 The difference between these rates is significant at the 3% level.255
With respect to the subset of fifty-six cases with non-zero settlement
amounts, institutional plaintiffs were more frequently represented than individual lead plaintiffs in the cases with the highest settlement amounts, and less frequently represented in cases with the lowest settlement amounts.256
For example, consider the ten lowest non-zero settlement amounts in our
sample. As shown below in Table 12, eight of those ten settlements had individual lead plaintiffs; just two were institutions.257
TABLE 12 LEAD PLAINTIFFS OF LOWEST NON-ZERO SETTLEMENTS
Defendant Company
Puda Coal, Inc.
ForceField Energy Inc.
Lentuo International Inc.
Longwei Petrol. Inv. Holding Ltd.
China-Biotics, Inc.
PhotoMedex, Inc.
China Valves Technology Inc.
China Natural Gas, Inc.
FAB Universal Corporation
ZST Digital Networks, Inc.

Settlement Am't
$100,000
$414,500
$1,000,000
$1,340,000
$1,400,000
$1,500,000
$1,500,000
$1,500,000
$1,500,000
$1,700,000

Lead Plaintiff
Indiv: Salomon Querub et al.
Indiv: Beverly Brewer
Three individuals
Three individuals
Two individuals
Asbestos Workers Local 14 Pension Fund
Bristol Investment Fund
Indiv: Robert Skeway
Six individuals
Indiv: J. Malcolm Gray

In contrast, consider the ten highest settlement amounts in our sample. As
shown below in Table 13, eight of those ten settlements had institutional lead
plaintiffs; just two were individuals.258

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

See infra Table 11.
See supra Table 11.
See supra Table 11.
Cf. supra Table 11.
Compare infra Table 12, with infra Table 13.
See infra Table 12.
See infra Table 13.
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TABLE 13 LEAD PLAINTIFFS OF LARGEST SETTLEMENTS
Defendant Company
Settlement Amount
Valeant Pharmaceuticals Int'l, Inc.
$1,210,000,000
Signet Jewelers Limited
$240,000,000
Nu Skin Enterprises, Inc.
$47,000,000
Lumber Liquidators Holdings, Inc.
$41,090,000
Questcor Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
$38,000,000
Green Mountain Coffee Roasters, Inc. $36,500,000
AAC Holdings, Inc.
$25,000,000
Aegerion Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
$22,250,000
SinoTech Energy Ltd.
$20,000,000
Banc of California, Inc.
$19,750,000

Lead Plaintiff
TIAA
Public Empl Retirement Syst of Mississippi
State-Boston Retirement System
Indiv: Gregg Kiken, Keith Foster
West Virginia Inv Mgt Retirement Bd et al.
Louisiana Muni. Police Emp. Ret. Sys. et al.
Arkansas Teacher Retirement System et al.
KBC Asset Management et al.
Indiv: Richard Zecher
Iron Workers Local No. 25 Pension Fund

Although our sample size is relatively small, and we want to be careful
about asserting statistical significance in this context, it does appear that the presence of an institutional lead plaintiff is associated with success in securities class
actions. We are not making claims about causation here: it is unclear whether
institutional investors decide to become, or are recruited to become, lead plaintiffs in better cases, or whether institutional investors somehow impact settlement amounts in those cases (or whether the converse is true for individual lead
plaintiffs). Nevertheless, it appears that even large institutions are willing to
serve as lead plaintiffs, including in the most successful cases, with the most
common institutional lead plaintiffs being large pension funds.
C.

Regulatory Actions

We now consider the potential relationship between negative activists and
regulatory actions. As with the link between negative activists and class action
suits,259 negative activists could identify problematic behavior which regulators
investigate and sanction. Consequently, with the aid of research assistants, we
searched legal and news databases260 to identify regulatory actions that were
brought as a consequence of a negative activism announcement. Unlike with
class actions, regulators almost never identified negative activists as their inspiration for investigation.261 We nevertheless drew this inference when the regulatory action concerned company behavior that was first identified and publicized
by a negative activist. We suspect this conservative identification approach understates the importance of negative activism for regulatory actions.
We identified thirty-nine unique262 negative activist campaigns that stimulated regulatory actions. The most common regulatory step was an exchange-

259. See, e.g., Choi et al., supra note 228, at 438–39.
260. Specifically, we concentrated on Lexis Securities Mosaic (which, among other things, aggregates 8-K,
10-K, and 10-Q disclosures of legal actions) and Factiva, although instances of regulatory actions unearthed when
conducting class action research were flagged as well. See Lexis Securities Mosaic, LEXISNEXIS,
https://www.lexissecuritiesmosaic.com/net/SMUSERMANAGER/login.aspx?ReturnUrl=%2fnet%2fhome
%2fkmhome.aspx (last visited Nov. 20, 2021) [https://perma.cc/5E8P-QJ6N]; Factiva, supra note 203.
261. See infra Table 14.
262. We consolidated multiple allegations of activism against the same company within thirty-one calendar
days, regardless of allegations, as well as allegations beyond thirty-one days that nevertheless concerned the same
company conduct.
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ordered halt in trading followed by a delisting from the exchange.263 The campaigns, however, provoked a variety of regulator responses from agencies ranging from the SEC to the DOJ to the FDA.264
We summarize key aspects of the thirty-nine regulatory actions in Table
14, although it is difficult to capture the full breadth of the responses in such
confined space.265

263.
264.
265.

See infra Table 14.
See infra Table 14.
See infra Table 14.
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TABLE 14 REGULATORY ACTIONS LINKED TO NEGATIVE ACTIVISM
Target

Regulator response

Aegerion Pharmaceuticals

DOJ investigation, criminal & civil charges; guilty plea by company w/ $40M payment

Alibaba Group Holding Ltd.

SEC investigation; still active as of 2020

Banc of California

China Agritech

SEC investigation; no recommendation of enforcement action
USAO criminal investigation and charges; SEC investigation & civil charge, resolved by
$1.5M payment from company, $20k from controller plus suspension
NASDAQ delisted stock

China Green Agriculture

SEC investigation, no enforcement action taken

China Integrated Energy

China-Biotics

NASDAQ delisted stock
NASDAQ delisted stock; SEC action w/ $19.2M default judgment and permanent bar
against CEO as D/O of public company, $50M judgment against company
NASDAQ delisted stock; SEC registration suspended
NASDAQ delisted stock; SEC investigation and charge, resolved w/ CEO barred from
D/O of public company for 10 years, $177k CEO payment and $815k company payment
NASDAQ delist; auditor fined $52k by SEC, company/officers fined $690k total, and
barred from director/officer/auditor in public company
NASDAQ delisted stock; SEC registration revoked

Deer Consumer Products

NASDAQ delisted stock

Duoyuan Global Water

NYSE delisted stock

Ebix

SEC, FBI, USAO investigations

Barrett Business Services

China MediaExpress Holdings
China Medical Technologies
China Natural Gas
China Valves Technology

Endurance Int'l Group Holdings SEC investigation and charge, resolved w/ cease and desist order, $8M civil penalty
FAB Universal Corporation

NYSE delisted stock

Flotek Industries

SEC investigation; no enforcement action
SEC investigation and charge, resolved w/ cease & desist order, $55.6M settlement w/
company & CEO; NASDAQ delisted stock
SEC and DOJ suits; CEO arrested; NASDAQ delisted stock
SEC and FTC investigations; $20M SEC settlement & $200M FTC settlement, business
practice changes and outside monitor
SEC investigation

Focus Media Holding Limited
ForceField Energy
Herbalife Ltd.
Linn Energy, LLC

Longtop Financial Tech. Limited SEC investigation and charge; NYSE delisted stock
SEC investigation and charges, resolved by civil injunction and $530k obtained from CFO;
Longwei Pet. Invest. Hld. Ltd.
NYSE delisted stock
CPSC investigation; CDC report; CT AG investigation; CARB investigation w/ $2.5M
Lumber Liquidators Holdings
settlement and initiation of compliance measures
Nu Skin Enterprises
SAIC (China) investigation
Puda Coal

SEC investigation and suit, resolved by $250M default judgment against Chinese chairman
and former CEO, permanent bar against D/O of public issuer; NYSE delisted stock

RINO International Corporation SEC investigation and charges, resolved by $3.75M & D/O bar; NASDAQ delisted stock
SEC investigation; BCSC (Canada) investigation; RCMP investigation; NYSE delisted
Silvercorp Metals
stock
Sino Clean Energy
NASDAQ delisted stock
SinoTech Energy Ltd.

Uni-Pixel,

NASDAQ delisted stock; SEC fraud charges
SEC investigation and charges, resolved by $3.725M penalties/disgorgement, bars against
execs from practicing as accountants
FDA investigation
FCC consent decree, $15M civil penalty, surrender network licenses, must sell all
remaining licenses and give 20% of proceeds (eventually $630M payment)
SEC investigation and charges against company, CFO, outside auditors, resolved by noncompany parties paying $275k in penalties and practicing bar; NASDAQ delist
SEC investigation, deferred prosecution, $750k settlement, D/O bar

Universal Travel Group

SEC investigation and charges, resolved by $935k and D/O bar; NYSE delisted stock

Valeant Pharmaceuticals Int'l

USAO criminal charges, conviction; 1 year sentences plus $9.7M forfeiture
SEC investigation and charges against company, CEO, auditor; auditors settled for $130k
and 3 year audit bar; NASDAQ delisted stock

St. Joe Company
St. Jude Medical
Straight Path Communications
Subaye

Yuhe International

To illustrate some of the broader implications from these linked regulatory
actions, we give particular color here to two campaigns and the resulting regulatory response. We first turn to Valeant Pharmaceuticals. In September and October 2015, Andrew Left’s Citron Research published reports alleging systemic
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price gouging across various pharmaceuticals by Valeant,266 as well as improper
ties between Valeant and its captive pharmacy Philidor that were used to inflate
drug sales figures.267 Valeant shares dropped 30% on the report.268 At the time,
Valeant was roughly a fifty billion269 manufacturer of pharmaceuticals and related products, the largest company in Canada,270 and a key holding of influential
hedge funds.271 Valeant initially denied the allegations,272 but a week later discontinued its relationship with Philidor.273
The allegations prompted action by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the
Southern District of New York.274 In November 2016, the Office brought
charges against both Philidor’s CEO and the Valeant executive primarily responsible for the Philidor relationship.275 Following a four-week trial, the two were
each sentenced to one year in prison and were ordered to forfeit a combined $9.7
million.276
The U.S. Attorney’s Office does not refer expressly to Citron’s activism.277
Nevertheless, we draw the connection for several reasons. First, Citron’s reports,
which constituted the first public allegations of the Valeant/Philidor relationship,

266. CITRON RSCH., WHY A CONGRESSIONAL SUBPOENA TO VALEANT ABOUT PRICE GOUGING ON DRUGS
SHOULD BE GRANTED 1 (2015), https://citronresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/valeant-part-1-final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZQ9U-G9A2].
267. CITRON RSCH., VALEANT: COULD THIS BE THE PHARMACEUTICAL ENRON? 5 (2015), https://citronresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Valeant-Philador-and-RandO-final-a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WT7NV2UG].
268. Antoine Gara, Valeant Plunges 30% After Short Seller Citron Research Makes Fraud Allegation,
FORBES (Oct. 21, 2015, 11:24 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/antoinegara/2015/10/21/valeant-plunges-30after-short-seller-citron-research-makes-fraud-allegation/?sh=667e2dd664ae [https://perma.cc/M9TW-RMZC].
269. See Caroline Humer, Valeant Shares Plunge on Short-Seller Scrutiny of Pharmacy Revenue, REUTERS
(Oct. 21, 2015, 9:42 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-valeant-citron/valeant-shares-plunge-on-shortseller-scrutiny-of-pharmacy-revenue-idUSKCN0SF22520151021 [https://perma.cc/EB26-FXMD].
270. Doug Alexander & Eric Lam, Valeant Passes RBC as Canada’s Largest Company by Market Value,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (July 23, 2015, 2:01 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-23/valeantpasses-rbc-as-canada-s-largest-company-by-market-value [https://perma.cc/6T58-AY8C].
271. See John Melloy & Everett Rosenfeld, Bill Ackman: I Bought 2M Shares of Valeant Today; I Believe
in the Company, CNBC (Oct. 21, 2015, 4:17 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/10/21/valeant-halted-in-heavytrading-down-28-after-citron-research-report.html [https://perma.cc/WS9S-768C] (noting sizable holdings by
Pershing Square and Paulson & Co.).
272. Matthew Goldstein, Alexandra Stevenson & Peter Eavis, Valeant’s Shares Fall on Report’s Fraud
Claim, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/22/business/dealbook/valeants-sharesfall-on-reports-fraud-claim.html [https://perma.cc/8S6Z-W9QV].
273. Drew Armstrong & Makiko Kitamura, Valeant Says It’s Cutting Ties with Troubled Pharmacy Philidor, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 30, 2015, 4:04 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-30/valeantsays-it-s-cutting-ties-with-troubled-pharmacy-philidor [https://perma.cc/F2Y7-R9R6].
274. Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Former Valeant Exec. & Former Philidor CEO Charged in Manhattan
Fed. Ct. for Illegal Fraud & Kickback Scheme (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/formervaleant-executive-and-former-philidor-ceo-charged-manhattan-federal-court [https://perma.cc/S8FX-GBWM].
275. Id.
276. Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Former Valeant Exec. & Former Philidor CEO Sentenced for Illegal
Kickback Scheme (Oct. 30, 2018); Jonathan Stempel, Convictions of Ex-Valeant and Philidor Executives Are
Upheld, Payouts Reduced, REUTERS (Oct. 31, 2019, 10:02 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bauschhealth-valeant-decision/convictions-of-ex-valeant-and-philidor-executives-are-upheld-payouts-reducedidUSKBN1XA21Y [https://perma.cc/F6EA-7Y72].
277. See Press Release, Dep’t of Just., supra note 274.
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were published over a year before the U.S. Attorney’s Office brought charges.278
Second, the Citron report concerns substantively the same behavior as the U.S.
Attorney’s Office charges.279 Finally, the charges note that “[n]either the nature
of Valeant’s relationship to Philidor, nor Valeant’s increasing dependence on
Philidor to achieve its sales and profitability goals, was disclosed to the public
by Valeant until investor websites and news organizations revealed suspect aspects of Philidor’s operations and Valeant’s connection to Philidor in or about
October 2015,”280 which we see as an oblique reference to Citron’s initial disclosure.
For another example, we turn to Carson Block’s Muddy Waters Research,
which has exposed improper financial practices by several Chinese companies.
One of its earliest targets was RINO International,281 a $400 million manufacturer and servicer of steel industry equipment.282 In November 2010, Muddy
Waters accused RINO of falsifying key numbers reported in its U.S. financial
filings and its management of tunneling company money for its personal use.283
RINO shares dropped 20%.284 Within the next ten days, the company investigated the claims raised by Muddy Waters and issued a public report admitting to
some of the allegations and informing the public that its previously released audited financials should no longer be relied upon.285
Muddy Waters’ allegations prompted an immediate investigation by the
NASDAQ Stock Market, where RINO’s shares were listed. NASDAQ sent
RINO a letter on November 17, 2010, expressly prompted by the Muddy Waters
report, requesting additional information regarding the report’s allegations, suspending RINO’s shares in the meantime.286 RINO did not respond, leading
NASDAQ to delist RINO’s shares effective December 30.287
After RINO delisted from the NASDAQ, it continued as a company.288
During that time, RINO’s audit committee conducted a further investigation into
the substance of Muddy Waters’ claims, finding that RINO kept different sets of
278. See id; CITRON RSCH., supra note 266, at 1 (providing that Citron first alleged foul play between Valeant and Philidor in September, 2015).
279. See CITRON RSCH., supra note 267, at 1 (discussing Valeant’s scheme to manipulate the market).
280. See Press Release, Dep’t of Just., supra note 274.
281. Hibah Yousuf, How Muddy Waters Spots Fraud in China, CNN MONEY (May 2, 2012, 9:39 AM),
https://money.cnn.com/2012/05/02/markets/muddy-waters-carson-block/index.htm [https://perma.cc/BV8W4Q5P].
282. RINO Int’l Corp., Litigation Release No. 22699, 2013 WL 2104623 (May 15, 2013); RINO International Corp Report, MUDDY WATERS RSCH. (Nov. 10, 2010), https://www.muddywatersresearch.com/content/
uploads/2010/11/RINO_MW_11102010.pdf [https://perma.cc/LFE5-KZDA].
283. RINO International Corp Report, MUDDY WATERS RSCH. (Nov. 10, 2010), https://www.muddywaters
research.com/content/uploads/2010/11/RINO_MW_11102010.pdf [https://perma.cc/LFE5-KZDA].
284. Colin Barr, Fraud Claim Mauls China’s RINO, FORTUNE (Nov. 11, 2010, 8:13 PM), https://fortune.com/2010/11/11/fraud-claim-mauls-chinas-rino/ [https://perma.cc/8PJR-Z6E5].
285. RINO Int’l Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Nov. 17, 2010).
286. RINO Int’l Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Nov. 22, 2010).
287. RINO Int’l Corp., Notification of Removal from Listing and/or Registration Under Section 12(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Form 25) (Dec. 12, 2010).
288. See Tiernan Ray, RINO: And So It Goes, BARRON’S (Dec. 2, 2010, 12:47 PM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/BL-SWB-18872?tesla=y [https://perma.cc/C5S7-GW9Y].
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financial records for its Chinese and U.S. audiences.289 The books had significant
financial differences, leading all three members of RINO’s audit committee to
resign.290
The Securities and Exchange Commission also later conducted an investigation. The investigation culminated in a complaint, and simultaneous settlement, against RINO’s CEO and RINO’s chairman of the board on May 15,
2013.291 RINO and the two individual defendants agreed to be permanently enjoined from violating the securities laws.292 The two individuals also agreed to
$250,000 in penalties, $3.5 million in disgorgement, and prohibitions from serving as officers or directors of a public company for ten years.293
The NASDAQ letters refer to the Muddy Waters report explicitly, so we
are comfortable drawing a connection between the report and those actions.294
Following the apparent convention by government regulators, however, the SEC
did not acknowledge Muddy Waters’ influence expressly.295 Instead, the SEC
complaint noted the role played by “a Hong Kong-based investment firm [which]
issued a research report” on November 10, 2010, the day of the Muddy Waters
report.296 Given this reference and Muddy Waters’ role as the first to publicize
the improprieties, we confidently linked the SEC action to this instance of activism as well.
D.

Intra-Company Changes

Finally, we investigate internal company-initiated changes. There are a variety of ways that negative activism could affect companies’ operations beyond
the financial performance analyzed earlier. Some of these will be hidden from
the public eye, such as when a company overhauls its compliance mechanisms
or conducts a private internal investigation.297 Other responses, however, will be
visible to the public.298
Three of these potential responses are collected by Audit Analytics, which
maintains databases of company executive changes, auditor changes, and

289. Complaint at 8, SEC v. RINO Int’l, (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 1:13-cv-00711).
290. Id. at 9.
291. Press Release, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges China-Based Executives in Scheme to Overstate
Revenues and Divert Money for Personal Use (May 15, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/20132013-87htm [https://perma.cc/HY23-VJHM].
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. See RINO International Corp Report, supra note 282; see also RINO Int’l Corp., supra note 286.
295. This is despite the SEC’s tendency to acknowledge assistance from other government groups. For an
interesting analysis exploiting this tendency, see Verity Winship, Enforcement Networks, 37 YALE J. REG. 274,
277 (2020).
296. See Complaint, supra note 289, at 7.
297. On occasion, these are publicly announced. See, e.g., Current Report China Integrated Energy, Inc.,
Current Report (Form 8-K) (Mar. 30, 2011) (noting commencement of independent investigation into short
sellers’ allegations).
298. See id.
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financial restatements from 2010 onward.299 We examine each of these databases
to determine what proportion of each might be attributable to negative activism.
Before proceeding to that analysis, we provide some important assumptions
and clarifications. Because the impetus for an executive change, auditor change,
or financial restatement is typically not provided in the Audit Analytics databases, we could not draw the same causative links that we did between negative
activism and class actions for regulatory actions.300 We therefore assume a connection when an event in the Auditor Analytics databases occurs within a year
of an earlier negative activism event about that company. We recognize that this
measure is doubtless both overinclusive (events within a year of negative activism may have nothing to do with the announcement) and underinclusive (responses may occur more than a year later), but it provides a workable analytical
framework. With this approach, a conservative back of the envelope calculation
suggests we should expect roughly 0.8% of all Audit Analytics data to occur
within a year of a negative activism announcement if there were no relationship
between negative activism and intra-company change; higher numbers suggest a
non-random relationship.301
With 0.8% of Audit Analytics data as a benchmark, we now turn to our
consideration of specific intra-company changes tracked by Audit Analytics.
1.

Key Person Changes

First, we look at turnover of key members of company management. Anecdotally, negative activism has provided, on occasion, the type of exposure that

299. AUDIT ANALYTICS, https://www.auditanalytics.com/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2021) [https://perma.
cc/B87U-YVDS]. Our negative activism events and Auditor Analytics databases do not cover the same time
periods. Negative activism events occurred from 2009 through 2016, while Audit Analytics covers 2010 through
the present. Id. We therefore chose to examine the percent of the events from 2010 through 2017 (one year after
our last negative activism event) in each Audit Analytics database that was preceded by a negative activism
announcement within a year. This approach results in understating the importance of negative activism for calendar years 2010 and 2017. In determining whether a database entry occurred within twelve months of negative
activism, the following tables did not drop repeated negative activism allegations against the same target. Our
numbers differ only slightly when repeated allegations are excluded.
300. A company’s executive change, for example, is often phrased as being for “personal reasons,” a euphemism for all sorts of potentially innocent or problematic behavior. See, e.g., Ian D. Gow, David F. Larcker &
Brian Tavan, Retired or Fired: How Can Investors Tell if a CEO Was Pressured to Leave?, STAN. CLOSER LOOK
SER., May 2017, at 2.
301. Our negative activism announcements target 573 unique public companies. From 2009 through 2017,
there were approximately 11,000 companies included in the CRSP database. Analysis of CRSP data. See Data
Access Tools, CTR. RSCH. SEC. PRICES, http://www.crsp.org/products/software-access-tools (last visited Nov. 19,
2021) [https://perma.cc/9GKJ-PJ3Z]. We have, therefore, negative activism campaigns against 5.2% of all public
companies. We examine nine years of Audit Analytics data; assuming no relationship between negative activism
and intra-company changes, we might therefore expect about 0.6% (5.2% divided by nine) of Audit Analytics
entries to follow within a year of negative activism. AUDIT ANALYTICS, supra note 299. Finally, some companies
are targeted by more than one instance of negative activism. On average, 1.4 campaigns are waged against each
public company in our database. Assuming, conservatively, that these allegations are at least one year apart (to
maximize the chance that an Audit Analytics data point will be preceded by negative activism within a year), we
might suppose that, at best, roughly 0.8% of all Audit Analytics data will be preceded by a negative activism
announcement - 0.6% multiplied by 1.4 - if there were only a random relationship between the two.
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leads CEOs and other top executives of companies to resign or be fired.302 We
therefore looked to Audit Analytics data on director and officer company
changes to calculate the proportion that occurred within the year following a negative activism announcement. We examined five categories of company turnover: the CEO, members of the board of directors, C-level members of the company (which includes the CEO), financial and legal officers, and any position
included within the database.303 We excluded departures coded by Audit Analytics as leaving due to ordinary retirement or death. Table 15 provides the results.304 As the Table shows, negative activism is most closely linked with lowerlevel officer turnover comprising the “any” category.305 Among higher level positions, C-level member turnover has the strongest link to negative activism.306
All categories are well above our 0.8% benchmark, suggesting a non-random
relationship between negative activism and key person changes.307
TABLE 15 DIRECTOR AND OFFICER TURNOVER

2.

Turnover Category

Number

Percent of AA
Database

CEO

35

1.32%

Board

82

1.87%

C-Level

90

2.10%

Financial/Legal

48

1.31%

Any Director/Officer

151

2.88%

Financial Restatements

Our next category of interest is financial restatements. Negative activism
can expose improper financial practices that require a company to restate its prior
financial statements.308 Audit Analytics tracks company financial restatements,
and we use the methodology described above to link negative activism to key

302. See, e.g., Daniela Wei & Jonathan Roeder, Luckin Coffee’s Recovery Just Got Tougher After Firing
CEO, BLOOMBERG (May 12, 2020, 10:12 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-05-12/luckinterminates-ceo-coo-after-probing-fabricated-transactions [https://perma.cc/RX3Z-LRXX] (noting firing of CEO
and COO).
303. AUDIT ANALYTICS, supra note 299. Audit Analytics includes turnover of the C-level, members of the
board of directors, legal, science and technology, administrative, financial, operations, controller, secretary, president, and executive or senior vice president. Id.
304. See infra Table 15.
305. See infra Table 15.
306. See infra Table 15.
307. See infra Table 15.
308. See, e.g., Yuhe Int’l, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 20, 2011) (auditor issuing non-reliance
recommendation for prior financial filings due to non-cooperation with negative activism investigation).
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person changes and auditor changes, examining the subset of financial restatements that were deemed to have an adverse impact on a company’s financials.309
Table 16 provides the results. As it suggests, the link between negative activism and financial restatements is not particularly strong at 0.76%, just below
our 0.8% benchmark and weaker than our executive turnover relationship found
earlier.310
TABLE 16 FINANCIAL RESTATEMENTS

3.

Number

Percent of AA
Database

18

0.76%

Auditor Changes

Our final category of interest consists of unusual auditor changes. As with
financial restatements, negative activism might expose the type of improper accounting practices that can give rise to auditor changes outside the normal course
of business.311 Consequently, we were interested in three categories of auditor
changes to capture extraordinary auditor changes: when the departing auditor had
issued a going concern opinion; when the company and the departing auditor
disagreed about accounting principles or practices, financial statement disclosure, or auditing scope or procedure; and when the auditor resigned for other
reasons.
We collect the results in Table 17. As it shows, the link between negative
activism and auditor changes is weak, beneath our 0.8% benchmark.312
TABLE 17: AUDITOR CHANGES
Percent of AA
Number
Database

12

0.52%

Despite the relatively weak connection between negative activism and auditor changes, the connection is not nonexistent. To illustrate, we provide details
about one of the events in our sample. On June 13, 2011, GeoInvesting, a microcap research firm, published a negative report about Yuhe International, a

309. AUDIT ANALYTICS, supra note 299. Because negative activism aspires to reduce company values, positive effects on a company’s financials would be unlikely to result from negative activism, making a link inappropriate.
310. See infra Table 16.
311. See, e.g., China Integrated Energy, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 2, 2011) (noting resignation
by auditor in response to company’s non-cooperation with investigation into negative activism allegations).
312. See infra Table 17.
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chicken farming company.313 The report accused Yuhe of never acquiring thirteen chicken farms at a claimed price of $15 million.314 Just days later, Yuhe
executives admitted to the inaccuracy of its financial disclosures, announcing
that a $12 million down payment on the farms had been diverted to a private
account controlled by the company’s CEO.315 Yuhe stock dropped 71% on the
announcement, with trading in the stock eventually halted and the stock delisted
from the NASDAQ.316 The company’s auditors also resigned on June 20, 2011,
noting Yuhe management’s “misrepresentation and failure to disclose material
facts surrounding certain acquisition transactions and off-balance sheet related
party transactions.”317
Overall, it is apparent from our database that negative activist interventions
have real, long-term effects.318 The announcement of negative activism is associated with long-term negative financial returns and performance, as well as litigation and regulatory action.319 Some anecdotal evidence suggests that negative
activism is also associated with intra-company changes as well. We now turn to
the regulatory and policy implications of our findings.320
IV. IMPLICATIONS
First, we consider several policy proposals related to different categories of
negative activism, including proposals left open in our prior work. We see little
justification for extensive regulation of short selling, particularly bans, given the
long-term nature of negative activism’s impact.321 We also think that many shortterm restrictions of negative activism are unwarranted, given the evidence that
on balance the short-term price impact of negative activism is not later reversed
and instead is associated with long-term negative effects.322 Indeed, to the extent
our results show that short-term reactions to the announcement of negative activism do not fully reflect long-term changes,323 that is an argument for relaxing
regulation of short selling, not imposing higher regulatory burdens.
Second, we assess three new categories of policy proposals related to the
long-term effects of negative activism. We consider ways in which negative activism might reinforce the private attorney general role played by shareholders
313. Yuhe International: Doubts on the Legitimacy of YUII’s Claimed Acquisition of Dajiang Farms,
GEOINVESTING (June 13, 2011), https://geoinvesting.com/yuhe-international-due-diligence-raises-doubts-concerning-the-legitimacy-of-yuiis-claimed-acquisition-of-dajiang-farms/ [https://perma.cc/FD5N-SA9Y].
314. Id.
315. James Sterngold, Shorting Chinese Chicken Breeder Earns Wings for GeoInvesting, BLOOMBERG (July
10, 2011, 12:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-07-10/shorting-chinese-chicken-breederearns-wings-for-geoinvesting [https://perma.cc/2F56-E86P]; Complaint at 2, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Yuhe
Int’l, Inc. (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 1:13-cv-1598).
316. Sterngold, supra note 319.
317. See Yuhe Int’l, Inc., supra note 308.
318. See infra Figure A4.
319. See infra Figure A4; supra Table 14.
320. See infra Figure A4.
321. See infra Figure A4.
322. See infra Figure A4.
323. See infra Figure A4.
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in securities class action litigation. Negative activism can act as a kind of filter
for discerning the most meritorious cases.
Third, we discuss how regulators might explicitly embrace negative activism as a signal for future investigations for regulators to conduct. Regulators
could look systematically at short positions and announcements by negative activists as a useful source of potential regulatory actions, and we suggest some
approaches for them to do so.
Finally, we examine how negative activism might be a source of improvements in corporate governance and operations at public companies. Specifically,
we suggest that corporate boards consider soliciting annual reports from their
largest short sellers. These reports could include the strongest cases from negative activists about problems at targeted firms, and arguments that the firms’
shares are overvalued. We discuss how policy changes might facilitate, encourage, and even protect boards that seek such reporting by negative activists.
A.

Prior Proposals Related to the Regulation of Negative Activism

As noted above, twelve business law professors, including one of us, recently petitioned the SEC with respect to two regulatory proposals.324 First, the
group suggested imposing a duty to update promptly a voluntary short position
disclosure that no longer reflects current holdings or trading intention.325 Second,
the group recommend a clarification that rapidly closing a short position after
publishing or commissioning a report can constitute fraudulent “scalping” in violation of Rule 10b-5.326
These proposals are consistent with some disclosure-based regulation of
positive activism, such as Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
which requires any entity or individual to disclose any beneficial ownership interests that exceed 5% of any class of public voting shares327 within ten days of
crossing the 5% threshold.328 Section 13(f) further requires that investment managers with significant assets under management disclose their quarterly holdings
within forty-five days of the close of each quarter.329 These disclosure requirements effectively require positive activists to update their positions periodically,
324. See Coffee, et al., supra note 35.
325. Id. at 3.
326. Id.
327. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2018). Section 13(g) contains a
similar disclosure provision. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(g); see also Bliss, Molk & Partnoy, supra note 4, at 1371–72
(discussing Section 13(d)-based disclosure regulation of positive activism).
328. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1); see, e.g., Schedule 13D and 13G, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.
sec.gov/fast-answers/answerssched13htm.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2021) [https://perma.cc/K42G-2JEY] (describing basic aspects of the regulation); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(a); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 22–
25 (discussing the history of section 13(d)’s attempt to impose disclosure requirements on cash tender offers for
control); Houman B. Shadab, The Law and Economics of Hedge Funds: Financial Innovation and Investor Protection, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 240, 260 (2009) (noting that the section is designed “[t]o regulate the market for
control of public companies”).
329. See Bliss, Molk & Partnoy, supra note 4, at 1372–73 (discussing Section 13(f)-based disclosure regulation of positive activism). Form PF further requires some private investment funds to submit reports about their
assets and trading strategies. See id. at 1373.
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and available evidence suggests that the positions held by positive activists, and
their disclosure of those positions, change over time.330
These disclosure-based rules do not apply to short positions under current
law.331 Accordingly, unlike positive activists, negative activists can accumulate
short positions of greater than 5% without disclosure. As a practical matter, as
Part III illustrates, the short positions held by negative activists typically are below this threshold.332 Perhaps for that reason, proposed disclosure requirements
for short positions frequently are at a lower ownership threshold than 5%.333 For
example, the European Union’s disclosure rules for short positions apply when
funds have short positions of 0.5% of a firm’s share value.334
On the other hand, although short positions are not subject to disclosure
rules, they are subject to significant regulation that does not apply to long positions.335 We describe the details of that regulation elsewhere, but it is worth summarizing them here, for a sense of their scope.336 For example, since the 1930s,
short sales have been subject to various changing versions of an “uptick rule,”
restricting short selling when prices have declined by a specified amount.337 One
theory supporting the uptick rule is that it will slow price declines and limit incentives to manipulate securities prices.338 Margin requirement also provide that
short sellers must post collateral representing a significant share of their short
positions.339
330. See generally Krishnan et al., supra note 10 and accompanying text (describing varying positions held
by activists over time).
331. See Bliss, Molk & Partnoy, supra note 4, at 1374–75; see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d),
(f), (g), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d), (f), (g) (2018). Some regulations require investment managers to disclose certain
information, regardless of whether it relates to long or short positions. See Regulation SBSR, 17 C.F.R.
§ 242.901(b) (2021).
332. See supra Part III.
333. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Robert J. Jackson, Jr. & Wei Jiang, Pre-Disclosure
Accumulations by Activist Investors: Evidence and Policy, 39 J. CORP. L. 1 (2013).
334. See Regulation (EU) 236/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 on
Short Selling and Certain Aspects of Credit Default Swaps, art. 6, 2012 O.J. (L 86) 1, 11; see also Short Selling,
EUR. SEC. & MKTS. AUTH., https://www.esma.europa.eu/regulation/trading/short-selling (last visited Nov. 19,
2021) [https://perma.cc/3R6Y-SGG8].
335. What Kinds of Restrictions Does the SEC Put on Short Selling?, INVESTOPEDIA (Jul. 26, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/011315/what-kinds-restrictions-does-sec-put-short-selling.asp
[https://perma.cc/LZZ9-CMUS].
336. See Bliss, Molk & Partnoy, supra note 4, at 1373–76 (discussing the regulation of short selling).
337. See Amendments to Regulation SHO, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,041, 18,042 (Apr. 20, 2009) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pt. 242) [hereinafter 74 Fed. Reg. 18,041]; Amendments to Regulation SHO, 75 Fed. Reg. 11,232,
11,244 (Mar. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242). The uptick rule had been enacted seventy years
before, in 1938. 74 Fed. Reg. 18,041 at 18,044.
338. See, e.g., Bliss, Molk & Partnoy, supra note 4, at 1375.
339. Regulation T requires short sellers to post collateral equal to 150% of the initial market value of the
shorted shares. Regulation T, 12 C.F.R. § 220.12(c)(1) (2021). Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA),
an organization governing the behavior of most brokers and dealers, requires shorts to be funded by at least 25%
of the shorted amount on an ongoing basis, after the trade has already been executed. FINRA, RULE 4210(c)
(2016). See generally Order Approving FINRA Rule 4210, 75 Fed. Reg. 41,562 (July 16, 2010); U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, Margin: Borrowing Money to Pay for Stocks (Apr. 17, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/
investor-publications/investorpubsmarginhtm.html [https://perma.cc/D5KG-2SHJ] (stating that “many brokerage firms have higher maintenance requirements” than FINRA’s minimum threshold); Nine Frequently Asked

PARTNOY & MOLK .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 1]

LONG-TERM NEGATIVE ACTIVISM

1/31/22 10:29 PM

53

Occasionally, short sales are banned in their entirety. For instance, the
United States banned short sales in securities of financial firms during the September 2008 peak of the global financial crisis.340 Section 16 of the Exchange
Act prohibits statutory insiders from selling shares of their company stock
short,341 meaning that such insiders are effectively prohibited from engaging in
negative activism.342 Regulation SHO343 prohibits “naked” short selling, in
which the short seller sells securities that she does not own or has not arranged
to borrow.344 Broker-dealers are also prohibited from executing customers’ short
sales if a short selling client has failed to deliver shares within three days of the
sale.345
The potential long-term benefits associated with negative activism that we
describe in Part III support an argument that this extensive web of short selling
regulation might not be normatively desirable.346 Short selling, and negative activism, are associated with informational efficiency through long-term share
price declines; long-term decreases in company operational performance; class
action lawsuits; regulatory actions; and executive turnover, financial restatements, and auditor changes.347 Strong normative arguments can be made in support of each of these outcomes, stressing the real benefits that short selling can
provide.
In light of these benefits, we believe much of the skepticism about short
selling regulation is unwarranted. We think this is especially true given, as we
found in Figure 1, that short sellers may act only after a meaningful runup in
stock prices to justify their bearing the costs of negative activism.348 To the extent regulations deter negative activists from taking short positions, market prices
might not accurately reflect negative information about companies’ future
Questions About Short Selling, CHARLES SCHWAB (May 19, 2020), https://www.schwab.com/active-trader/insights/content/9-frequently-asked-questions-about-short-selling [https://perma.cc/CA72-YLQ3] (imposing
maintenance margin requirements ranging from 30% to 100%).
340. Henry T. C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, "Pure Information," and the SEC Disclosure
Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1694 (2012). The last time short selling experienced blanket bans in the United
States was in 1931. Id. at 1695.
341. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (2021). The provision also is known for
its limits short-swing profits by requiring disgorgement of profits gained (or losses avoided) by purchases followed by sales (or sales followed by purchases) within any six-month period. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b).
342. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(1).
343. See Regulation SHO, 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.200–242.204 (2021).
344. See Short Sales, 68 Fed. Reg. 62,972, 62,975–78 (Nov. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240,
242). Regulation SHO is buttressed by special antifraud liability for those who misrepresent to broker-dealers
that they can deliver shorted shares. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-21(a) (2020); cf. “Naked” Short Selling Antifraud Rule,
73 Fed. Reg. 61,666, 61,675 (Oct. 17, 2008) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (noting that Rule 10b-21 imposes
no additional liability beyond that already contained within section 10 and Rule 10b-5). Naked short selling has
presented interesting policy questions related to when the short seller is unable to deliver the shorted shares,
leaving the purchaser unable to vote the shares she thought she purchased and leaving the short seller subject to
large financial exposure. See, e.g., Bliss, Molk & Partnoy, supra note 4, at 1373–74.
345. Amendments to Regulation SHO, 74 Fed. Reg. 38,266, 38,269 (July 31, 2009) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 200, 242) (enacting Rule 204).
346. See supra Part III.
347. See Molk & Partnoy, supra note 76, at 859–62.
348. See id.; see also supra Figure 1.
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prospects. Moreover, deterrence of short sellers could reduce the information
available to litigants and regulators for policing the financial markets for fraud.
In addition, many negative activists voluntarily disclose their positions.349
Indeed, their voluntary announcement of short positions provides the data that
researchers, including us, have used to measure the short-term market reaction
to the announcement of negative activism.350
Accordingly, regulation of short selling should take into account not just
the potential costs of negative activism, but also its benefits, recognizing that
many negative activists already provide information to the market. We do not
mean to imply that short selling should be regulation-free, but we do think that
the blanket bans that have been periodically adopted constitute shortsighted, undesirable regulatory policy.
When deciding how short selling should be regulated, it is useful to consider the purposes that the short selling is trying to accomplish. In our prior work,
we emphasized the distinction between informational negative activism, which
is largely focused on informing markets about potential overvaluation, from operational activism, which is largely focused on actually destroying operational
value at targeted companies.351 The evidence we present here suggests that negative activists, at least when measured by their voluntary disclosures, are primarily focused on informational negative activism.352 Our evidence also suggests
that, on balance, short-term price declines reflect a mispricing in the market
(meaning an overvaluation of the targeted company).353 To the extent negative
activism is “operational” in any sense, it appears to relate more to later legal and
regulatory intervention, which negatively impact companies during the years after the announcement of activism.
On the other hand, an alternative interpretation of negative activism’s longrun negative impact on targets is that the activism itself is destroying value at the
company, from an operational perspective, and that this value destruction would
not otherwise occur in the absence of negative activism. Instead of exposing
overvalued companies, perhaps negative activists’ interventions cause the overvaluation, leading to declines that would not otherwise occur. Indeed, our research uncovers some non-traditional ways that this value destruction could occur. For instance, to the extent securities litigation or regulatory intervention are
viewed as destroying value, as opposed to playing a legitimate social value-creating function,354 one could argue that the negative activist interventions are destroying operational value, by forcing targeted companies to devote resources to
non-operational costs. These effects would be an undesirable consequence of
negative activism, justifying potential regulation of the practice. Although it is

349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.

See, e.g., Bliss, Molk & Partnoy, supra note 4, at 1339, 1345.
See id. at 1339–45.
Id. at 1345–67.
Id. at 1340.
See supra Part II.
See Bliss, Molk & Partnoy, supra note 4, at 1352–54.
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difficult to find a theoretical explanation for this result over the long term, it is
consistent with our empirical evidence.
Moreover, the fact that initial price declines associated with the announcement of negative activism do not reflect the full long-term declines, and the fact
that stock prices continue to decrease significantly in the long term, each raise
questions about why the market might not fully value the initial information provided by the activist.355
We cannot resolve all these issues here. But our preliminary sense is that
the substantial evidence of the long-term effects of negative activism weakens
the arguments in favor of regulating these activities solely for short-term purposes. In particular, we suspect it is difficult to justify aspects of the regulation
of markets that impose costs differentially on short selling and negative activists.
For example, short selling is subject to higher capital gains taxes than positive
share trading.356 Likewise, other rules, including margin requirements and uptick
rules, apply differentially to short sales. The evidence here supports our prior
normative conclusion: non-manipulative informational negative activism should
be encouraged, while manipulative uses should be discouraged.357
Indeed, the underappreciated benefits of short selling could argue in favor
of some innovative private uses of the practice that could improve social welfare.
We discuss some of these in our prior work,358 in an attempt to overcome some
of the resistance that private investors have towards the practice. Japan’s Government Pension Investment Fund, for instance, recently announced that its $1.6
trillion fund would not lend shares or otherwise support short sellers, based on
the perception that short sellers care only about short-term price movements.359
Our findings in this Article belie this claim and support an expansion particularly
in light of its information producing potential.360 Consider one perhaps controversial business model: investigative journalists who fund their reporting of negative information about companies by selling shares short in advance of the publication of articles.361 Journalists who target firms engaging in fraud have
355. One possible interpretation is that the negative activist is initially providing only some information,
with more revealed over time. Yet a puzzle still remains: if market participants are aware that, on average, initial
negative activist interventions usually produce more negative information in the future, why do the stock prices
of targeted firms decline by only 7% initially, instead of declining by more in anticipation of later information
that will become available?
356. See Laura Saunders & Mischa Frankl-Duval, The Tax Moves Day Traders Need to Make Now, WALL
ST. J. (Sept. 11, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-tax-moves-day-traders-need-to-make-now-115998
16642 [https://perma.cc/7FSW-4SLR].
357. To the extent that the proposed rulemaking we discuss earlier would deter manipulative uses of short
selling while leaving intact its nonmanipulative ones, we applaud it. See supra notes 192–93 and accompanying
text.
358. Molk & Partnoy, supra note 76, at 859–62.
359. Mark Gilbert, This $1.6 Trillion Fund Says Short Selling Is Wrong, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 22, 2020),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-01-22/japan-s-pension-fund-manager-opts-out-of-short-selling [https://perma.cc/H867-S639].
360. See supra Part IV.
361. See Scott Gurvey, Insider Trading and the Business Reporter, NAT’L CTR. BUS. JOURNALISM (Jan. 27,
2017), https://businessjournalism.org/2017/01/danger-business-journalist-danger/ [https://perma.cc/MD6R2MYR].
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significant disincentives to undertake investigations, and often are punished or
threatened for their efforts, even when those investigations ultimately prove to
be accurate.362 Wirecard is a prominent example, where investigative journalists
from the Financial Times were met with hacking attempts, a sting operation, allegations against their employer, and a criminal complaint filed against them and
their associates by BaFin, Germany’s financial regulator, throughout their exposure of endemic fraud at the company.363
Imagine in the extreme if an entity engaging in investigative journalism
partnered with a hedge fund to target companies that appear to be overvalued or
engaging in fraud, took short positions in those companies where the investigators confirm that there are real problems, and then published those findings.364
The information production associated with this activity could counterbalance
some of the skewed incentives for positive disclosures at companies, and the financial returns upon publication could provide the push for journalists to weather
the costs that these investigations often entail.
Even if journalist-hedge fund partnerships do not form, the evidence presented here suggests that policy makers should consider the real and long-term
impact of negative activism when assessing the regulation of short selling.365 The
apparent information-centric focus of negative activism in the long term supports
our tentative conclusions in prior research, where we suggested that regulators
should take a lighter touch with informational negative activism.366 Now that
conclusion is stronger, and backed by extensive long-term evidence.367
B.

Negative Activism and Securities Litigation

Stock price-driven securities litigation has presented thorny policy questions with which industry players, regulators, and courts are just beginning to
grapple.368 While our evidence is somewhat consistent with the observation that
price-driven litigation is a real phenomenon, it also suggests the problems associated with such litigation might not be as serious as some critics assert. Although
it might be a laudable goal to address the costs of price-driven litigation as soon
as possible, we suggest that there might be significant benefits from taking a
more measured approach over time, so that any policy response can take into
account the additional information we present here.369
362. See Targeting the Messenger: Investigative Journalists Under Extreme Pressure, INDEX CENSORSHIP
(Jan. 2019), https://www.indexoncensorship.org/targeting-the-messenger-investigative-journalists-under-extreme-pressure/ [https://perma.cc/5KD6-TV5P].
363. McCrum, supra note 19.
364. Insider trading restrictions could provide an obstacle if the journalist trades without her employer’s
consent, but this obstacle could seemingly be overcome if the journalist traded with her employer’s blessing. See
Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 24–25 (1987).
365. See supra Part IV.
366. Bliss, Molk, & Partnoy, supra note 4, at 1334.
367. See supra Section III.C.; Bliss, Molk & Partnoy, supra note 4, at 1385.
368. See discussion supra Section IV.A.
369. For application of this approach to the regulatory process specifically, see Peter Molk & Arden Rowell,
Reregulation and the Regulatory Timeline, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1497, 1500 (2016). For the merits of this approach
more generally, see generally FRANK PARTNOY, WAIT: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF DELAY (2012).
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The evidence in Part III also raises new policy questions that have not previously been considered by policymakers or in the literature. One relates more
broadly to the demonstrated relationship between negative activism announcements and the subsequent filing of federal securities class actions. What are the
normative implications of this relationship?
The answer depends in part on what one thinks of federal securities class
actions. If one views such litigation as primarily circular and redistributive, with
negative social value, the conclusion should be that this particular aspect of negative activism is normatively undesirable. However, even if one has such a view
of litigation, a more direct remedy would be to reform the litigation system rather
than regulating negative activism.
On the other hand, if one views federal securities class actions as, at least
on balance, providing a socially valuable way to deter and compensate for fraudulent activities, the role of negative activism is unquestionably a good one: provide a signal to shareholders and litigators regarding cases they might file. Indeed, to the extent litigators are economically rational, the fact that they respond
to the interventions by negative activists suggests that these litigators see positive
value in the disclosures.
Our empirical findings suggest that the relationship between negative activism and securities class actions is highly variable.370 Law firms vary in the
extent to which they rely on negative activism as well as in the extent to which
their suits result in financial recoveries.371 This variability across law firms suggests that policy responses might similarly vary based on the individual characteristics of a law firm or suit. For example, judges adjudicating securities class
actions could explicitly take into account both the price reaction associated with
the filing of litigation and the track record of a particular law firm with respect
to the price reaction and results in past cases. Judges might do so, for instance,
by relying on relative stock market reaction in assessing law firms for purposes
of determining lead plaintiff status. A law firm whose filings are associated with
larger stock price reactions arguably is being assessed by market participants as
more credible and reliable in litigation than a law firm whose filings are associated with little or no stock market reaction.372
Indeed, our understanding, and the understanding of others, is that law firm
reputation matters for the adjudication of class actions.373 Our evidence provides
a way for judges to include law firm reputation in a more objective, fact-based
way than relying on informal assessments of reputation. Our “league tables”
370. See supra Section III.B.
371. See supra Section III.B.
372. Helpfully, since the class action’s filing may include little new material information beyond the fact
that the particular law firm endorses the negative activist’s allegations, CARs around successive law firm filings
can be rough measures of market perceptions of those firms’ abilities.
373. See, e.g., TCW Tech. Ltd. P’ship v. Intermedia Commc’ns, Inc., No. 18336, 2000 WL 1654504, at *4
(Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 2000) (noting that the lead plaintiff selection should incorporate, among other things, the
“quality of the pleading that appears best able to represent the interests of the shareholder class”); Adam B.
Badawi & David H. Webber, Does the Quality of the Plaintiffs’ Law Firm Matter in Deal Litigation?, 41 IOWA
J. CORP. L. 359, 362 (2015) (“[B]oth securities class actions and acquisition-related cases rely on assessments of
the law firm quality.”).
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provide some data for judges to reference when making decisions about the involvement of particular law firms in litigation.374 Law firm reputation should, of
course, not be the sole determinant for appointing lead plaintiffs, but it may enter
(explicitly or implicitly) into the decision of which plaintiff might most effectively represent the class’s interests.
Judges also could look to the price reactions associated with both negative
activist announcement and the announcement of litigation in making more substantive decisions in cases, either at the motion to dismiss phase or in deciding
motions for summary judgment. Litigation that explicitly references or quotes
from negative activist interventions arguably should be viewed as stronger substantively when the activist intervention was associated with a greater abnormal
return. In other words, judges could rely (within the constraints of appropriate
judicial notice) on the informational content of the market’s reaction to both the
negative activist and the linked complaint filing in deciding aspects of cases.
Finally, the positive relationship between the involvement of negative activists and subsequent plaintiffs’ litigation375 suggests yet another argument, in
addition to those presented above, against restrictions on negative activists. To
the extent negative activists facilitate a private attorney general role by class action attorneys, their involvement can contribute to the policing of securities markets for corporate malfeasance. On the other hand, to the extent policymakers
seek to restrict abusive litigation, we show the involvement of negative activists
contributes to additional litigation, not all of which has merit.
At minimum, our evidence suggests that in dozens of cases, plaintiffs’ lawyers are relying on the actions of negative activists.376 The data collected suggest
that those lawyers could be more systematic in analyzing both the substance of
negative activist announcements and the cumulative abnormal returns associated
with those announcements. The revelation of information by negative activists is
arguably a key event in establishing loss causation and damages, and a careful
analysis of stock returns surrounding activism announcements could help lawyers filter which cases to file.377 Moreover, when—as we often find—short-term
drops are followed by long-term underperformance,378 plaintiffs’ lawyers could
attempt to argue that damages are greater than those associated with a short-term
event study of returns surrounding the negative activism announcement. Although long-term event studies are controversial, our evidence supports an argument that damages from misrepresentations and omissions uncovered by negative activists are significantly greater than the average short-term return of
negative 7%.
374. See supra Tables 7, 8.
375. See discussion supra Section III.B.
376. See discussion supra Section III.B.
377. Some degree of this practice already is occurring. See, e.g., Jeffrey Lubitz & Elisa Mendoza, Event
Driven Securities Litigation: The New Driver in Class Action Growth, D&O DIARY (Dec. 9, 2020), https://www.
dandodiary.com/2020/12/articles/securities-litigation/guest-post-event-driven-securities-litigation-the-newdriver-in-class-action-growth/ [https://perma.cc/DV4C-JMMS] (discussing the relationships among prominent
events, stock price drops, and shareholder litigation).
378. See, e.g., discussion supra Sections III.A.1, III.A.2.
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Negative Activism and Regulatory Interventions

As with securities class actions, similar arguments can be made about the
socially beneficial impact of negative activism leading to regulatory interventions. Our evidence suggests that negative activists play a crucial role in providing the impetus for regulatory action to prosecute fraud and other misdoings at
targeted companies.379 To the extent policymakers are considering restrictions
on short selling or other actions to regulate negative activists, they should take
into account adverse impacts on this positive role in facilitating government enforcement that negative activism serves.
On the other hand, to the extent one views regulatory enforcement as misguided or imposing unwarranted costs,380 negative activism could be viewed as
contributing to regulatory enforcement actions that are not socially valuable. Either way, our contribution is to demonstrate the association of negative activism
with regulatory intervention.
Of course, we recognize that the number of regulatory interventions in our
database might appear to be relatively small: just thirty-nine actions.381 We cannot observe additional investigations that were started but did not lead to formal
action, and it is possible that there are significant numbers of those investigations. Moreover, the fact that negative activists are providing information that
leads to thirty-nine regulatory actions is itself significant. To the extent restrictions on short selling deter negative activists, they could result in fewer regulatory interventions and investigations.
Our data also suggest that regulators could benefit by more explicitly engaging with negative activists. For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission could formally track events of negative activism and then use those
events as a source of potential investigations. Regulators also could host periodic
roundtables for negative activists to present their views of targeted companies
that they believe warrant some form of regulatory intervention. Regulators likely
review negative activist interventions informally, but our evidence suggests there
might be some benefit from formalizing such review, especially given the incomplete levels of policing by plaintiffs’ attorneys suggested by Table 10.382
On the other hand, regulatory reliance on negative activists could generate
socially problematic reactions. Negative activists might attempt to use follow-on
formal regulatory processes to attempt to amplify short-term stock price drops.
Such practices might be especially problematic for anonymous negative activist
interventions, which might be more prone to engage in stock price
379. See discussion supra Section III.C.
380. Examples of this view are not difficult to find. See, e.g., Sara Salinas & Christine Wang, Elon Musk
Mocks SEC as “Shortseller Enrichment Commission” Days After Settling Fraud Charges, CNBC (Oct. 4, 2018),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/04/elon-musk-mocks-sec-as-shortseller-enrichment-commission-days-after-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/7TN5-QZYY] (referring to the SEC as the “Shortseller Enrichment Commission”); Aarthi Swaminathan, Mark Cuban: The SEC Is ‘Useless’, YAHOO FIN. (May 28, 2019), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/mark-cuban-sec-151005564.html [https://perma.cc/33JW-CSPD] (referring to the SEC as
“useless” and bringing “ridiculous” lawsuits).
381. See supra Table 14.
382. See supra Section III.B; supra Table 10.
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manipulation,383 although regulators could require negative activists to identify
themselves for the event to become a candidate for formal regulatory proceedings.
In any event, the fact that negative activist interventions are associated with
some regulatory intervention384 suggests that negative activists are, at least some
of the time, facilitating regulatory functions. This facilitation should be part of
policy discussion of the regulation of short selling and negative activism.
D.

Negative Activism and Corporate Governance

Finally, the evidence presented here raises some interesting implications
about the relationship between negative activism and corporate governance. Before we were aware of the statistically significant negative association between
negative activism and long-term returns as well as operating performance, we
hypothesized that any short-term stock price drops associated with negative activism might be reversed in the long-term.385 The idea would be that, in theory,
negative activism might identify corporate governance failures and thereby create incentives for firms to improve their governance. We were not alone in this
assumption.386
Moreover, some past anecdotal evidence had suggested that negative activists occasionally reversed their initial short positions in companies, later acquiring long positions, predicting that companies would improve their operations after the negative disclosure.387 This anecdotal evidence suggested that negative
activism might be associated with long-term improvements in corporate governance and performance.
However, our results presented in Part III show otherwise: negative activism’s long-term association with negative returns and negative operating performance suggests that targeted companies are not improving in any real or systematic sense.388 The negative long-term effects are not consistent with improved
corporate governance, though we acknowledge the theoretical possibility that
corporate governance could improve in ways that stock prices or objective financials do not capture.389

383. Moreover, many high-profile negative activists appear not to intervene anonymously. See supra Section IV.A.
384. See discussion supra Section III.C.
385. Bliss, Molk & Partnoy supra note 4, at 1392–93.
386. See Coffee, supra note 18 (noting the prevalence of “‘pseudonymous’ sellers that sell short, publish a
lengthy, detailed, and plausible attack on the target company, but then close their short positions shortly thereafter
(without disclosure), sometimes even going long in the stock to profit on any later rebound in the stock price
when management replies.”).
387. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 151.
388. Nevertheless, because of the way our sample is constructed, it may not present an unbiased picture of
negative activism’s impact on company prices. For discussion of our sample, see supra notes 113–17 and accompanying text.
389. For instance, the effects of governance improvements might be overwhelmed by other negatives, either
in terms of information or operations, resulting in a net negative impact on share prices.
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One possible interpretation of the long-run association of negative activism
with deteriorating performance is that it is consistent with the initial negative
share price reaction. A negative market reaction is consistent with expectations
of worse performance, and given the extended time that some short theses require
to be realized, short- and long-term declines might not be unexpected.390 Our
long-term share price adjustment aligns with other findings in the finance literature showing that share price adjustments to negative information occur over
long periods of time.391
Negative activism’s association with long-term share price drops and weakened operating performance also suggests that negative activism might be an untapped source of improvement in corporate governance and operations at public
companies. Corporate managers who are targeted by negative activisms are understandably defensive about those interventions.392 But one alternative reaction
could be to see the announcement of negative activism as an opportunity to improve corporate governance and operations. Managers who view negative activists as a potential source of useful information, rather than simply a threat, might
even incorporate negative activists into their governance structure.
For example, corporate boards could solicit annual reports from their largest short sellers. A board might ask negative activists with the top three largest
short positions to present their negative cases, including any arguments that the
firms’ shares are overvalued. Directors would not need to engage with the short
sellers at the meeting; instead, they could simply hear the information and consider any data and arguments.
Of course, officers and directors might not want to hear from short sellers,
who are the corporate equivalent of a sworn enemy. Moreover, they might worry
about exposure to litigation or regulatory enforcement from being made aware
of information presented by the negative activists, since awareness arguably
brings a legal duty to investigate and monitor based on the information.393
However, given the significant informational value of negative activist interventions, and the long-term negative association with returns and performance, the potential gains could be significant from managers’ obtaining early
access to negative information, and then preemptively addressing any problems
that information raises. If share prices are expected to rise, then firms might have
to pay negative activists for those activists to share information;394 payment in

390. For instance, significant parts of Bill Ackman’s allegations against Herbalife were eventually settled
with U.S. regulators, but not until seven to eight years after Ackman’s initial activism. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra
note 165; Jon Shazar, SEC, DoJ Say Bill Ackman Was Right About Herbalife All Along, DEALBREAKER (May 11,
2020), https://dealbreaker.com/2020/05/herbalife-fined-for-china-bribery [https://perma.cc/R4A7-HYCL].
391. See generally Lauren Cohen, Christopher Malloy & Quoc Nguyen, Lazy Prices, 75 J. FIN. 1371 (2020)
(demonstrating long-term negative returns associated with changes to the language and construction of financial
reports).
392. See, e.g., Wei & Roeder, supra note 302.
393. See, e.g., In re Caremark Int’l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 960 (Del. Ch. 1996).
394. Otherwise, because negative activists profit when prices decrease, the activists would have little reason
to share accurate information.
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long-term stock options that could be exercised in the future, once governance
effects could take effect, could align the activists’ interests with companies’.
There might be perverse short-term incentives for negative activists to manipulate share prices, but it would be risky for negative activists to misrepresent
information. If there are concerns about the accuracy of those communications,
corporate boards could record and publish the presentations.395
We recognize that this proposal is likely to be controversial. But the overwhelming evidence of the long-term effects of negative activism suggests that at
least some companies could benefit from taking the initiative by proactively inviting negative activists to make their best case to the board. Moreover, policymakers might facilitate, encourage, and even protect boards that seek negative
activist reporting from Caremark-type legal liability.396 For example, legislators
or courts could provide protections to board members for breach of fiduciary
duty litigation related to the intervention of negative activists.
Alternatively, underwriters of securities issues could be encouraged to solicit information from negative activists as part of their due diligence process.
Underwriters could include information from negative activists in their due diligence investigation and memoranda, and courts could include reliance on that
information when assessing underwriter due diligence.397
Another mechanism for improving corporate governance could be to marry
the functions of negative activists and investigative journalism. Managers are
sensitive to media scrutiny, which can provide a disciplining mechanism.398
However, as the profitability of investigative journalism has declined, many media organizations have cut staffs and budgets.399
What if journalists were financially incentivized to monitor corporations
and their managers more closely by shifting their business model to include profiting from short positions in the targets of their investigations? Imagine a hedge
fund hiring investigators, forensic accountants, and financial experts to work together to find overvalued target companies. They would then take short positions
in these companies and publish reports of problems. Such hybrid short sellerjournalist firms would survive only to the extent they were able to uncover sufficiently valuable, and accurate, negative information.
This hybrid business model could present regulatory and ethical challenges.
In the past, journalists have been accused of insider trading related to their
395. See, e,g., In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 963.
396. See id.
397. Since issuers lack a due diligence defense to Section 11 liability, they should also have strong incentives to engage with negative activists, and we might expect underwriters at a minimum to obtain copies of that
information. Doing so could be expected to improve the gatekeeping role that underwriters traditionally play.
See, e.g., Andrew F. Tuch, The Limits of Gatekeeper Liability, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 619, 622 (2017);
Andrew F. Tuch, Multiple Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L. REV. 1583, 1588–89 (2010).
398. See Bliss, Partnoy & Furchtgott, supra note 82, at 62; Molk & Partnoy, supra note 76, at 859–62.
399. See Mason Walker, U.S. Newsroom Employment Has Fallen 26% Since 2008, PEW RSCH. (July 13,
2021),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/07/13/u-s-newsroom-employment-has-fallen-26-since2008/ [https://perma.cc/4PYE-9RLU]; Lauren Harris & Gabby Miller, The 2020 Journalism Crisis: A Year in
Review, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.cjr.org/business_of_news/journalism-crisis-in2020.php [https://perma.cc/9WDY-S5G5].
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investigations of companies.400 The experts in journalism we have asked about
this proposal have suggested it would be highly controversial and would violate
traditional norms of journalism and possibly a range of laws.401 Regulators likely
would need to be persuaded to amend insider trading rules, or at least not to bring
actions against negative activists. On the other hand, there is an argument that
negative activists already play this quasi-journalistic function, and that a hybrid
business model would not be substantively different from what many negative
activists already do. Still, it would be surprising today to see an organization such
as ProPublica take significant short positions in companies its journalists investigate.
We emphasize this hybrid proposal here because we see sharp financial
incentives to profit from negative information about companies as a potential
lever to improve corporate governance. At minimum, the evidence presented in
Part III suggests that corporate managers should pay more attention to short
sellers and negative activists and take them more seriously as valuable sources
of information.
V. CONCLUSION
We present new empirical evidence of the long-term effects of negative
shareholder activism, particularly the long-term association of negative activism
with share returns, performance, litigation, regulatory action, and internal corporate changes. The association presents reasons to be both encouraged by, and
suspect of, negative activism. We find long-term negative financial performance
by the targets of negative activism and by the targets of class actions inspired by
negative activism.402 We also find a positive relationship between negative activism and regulatory investigations and internal corporate changes.403 Our analysis suggests that negative activists play a more important role than has previously been understood.
We thus follow a similar path to the literature on positive shareholder activism. As negative activism research becomes more prominent, and as short
selling likely will play a more significant role in markets and among policy makers, we hope the evidence presented here will encourage regulators and market
participants to incorporate the informational value associated with negative activism into their private and public policies. At minimum, we believe policy discussions of negative activism will benefit from the new evidence we present.

400.
401.
402.
403.

See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 28 (1987).
Interviews on file with authors.
See infra Table A1.
See discussion supra Sections III.C, III.D.
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APPENDIX
We provide additional information about our sample of negative activism
reports, as well as our empirical findings, in this Appendix.
Our empirical analysis is based on 825 reports of negative activism from
Activist Shorts Research reports. Table A1 provides an industry breakdown of
the targets of negative activism, while Figure A1 shows the distribution over time
of our negative activism reports.
TABLE A1:TARGETS OF NEGATIVE ACTIVISM
Industry

NAICS
Code

Accommodation and Food Services

72

Administrative and Support and Waste
Management and Remediation Services

56

Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting

11

Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation

71

Construction

23

Educational Services

61

Finance and Insurance

52

Health Care and Social Assistance

62

Information

51

Management of Companies and Enterprises

55

Manufacturing

31-33

Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction

21

Other Services (except Public Administration)

81

Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services

54

Public Administration

92

Real Estate and Rental and Leasing

53

Retail Trade

44-45

Transportation and Warehousing

48-49

Utilities

22

Wholesale Trade

42

TOTAL

# of Firms
(share)
8
(1.40%)
26
(4.54%)
3
(0.52%)
5
(0.87%)
6
(1.05%)
10
(1.75%)
43
(7.50%)
13
(2.27%)
63
(10.99%)
4
(0.70%)
194
(33.86%)
37
(6.46%)
3
(0.52%)
91
(15.88%)
1
(0.17%)
11
(1.92%)
28
(4.89%)
5
(0.87%)
7
(1.22%)
15
(2.62%)

# of Campaigns
(share)
13
(1.58%)
28
(3.39%)
3
(0.36%)
7
(0.85%)
7
(0.85%)
11
(1.33%)
65
(7.88%)
17
(2.06%)
105
(12.73%)
5
(0.61%)
282
(34.18%)
52
(6.30%)
6
(0.73%)
132
(16.00%)
1
(0.12%)
12
(1.45%)
37
(4.48%)
5
(0.61%)
10
(1.21%)
27
(3.27%)

573

825
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FIGURE A1:TIMING OF NEGATIVE ACTIVISM
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In the main text, we study the relationship between negative activism and
shareholder class action lawsuits. Figures A2 and A3 provide additional detail
about the settlements of those class action lawsuits. The range of settlements is
dramatic, from $0 to $1.2 billion. Unsurprisingly, a small number of lawsuits
accounted for the bulk of total settlement amounts, while a significant portion of
settlements are dismissed (with a $0 settlement).
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FIGURE A2:CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT HISTOGRAM
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FIGURE A3:DISTRIBUTION OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AMOUNTS
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Table 6 in the main text provides cumulative abnormal return estimates for
the first filing of a class action related to negative activism. However, because of
the close proximity between some negative activism events and related class action lawsuits, some of the cumulative abnormal return amounts in Table 6 may
be more attributable to negative activism than to the filing of a class action.
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Consequently, Table A2 below repeats the analysis for the subset of class actions
filed at least eleven trading days after the relevant negative activism event. As it
shows, the results are similar to those reported in Table 6, although the [-1, 1]
window now lacks statistical significance.
TABLE A2
Panel A: Fama-French Three Factor
Holding Period (in days)
[-1,1]
[-3,3]
[-10,1]
Average
-2.10%
-9.04%***
-17.24%***
Median
-2.49%
-9.29%
-17.60%
Standard Deviation
(1.69)
(2.07)
(3.42)
Events
54
54
54
Panel B: Fama-French Four Factor
Holding Period (in days)
[-1,1]
[-3,3]
[-10,1]
Average
-2.05%
-9.07%***
-17.20%***
Median
-2.40%
-9.49%
-17.66%
Standard Deviation
(1.69)
(2.08)
(3.38)
Events
54
54
54
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard
errors in parentheses.

Additionally, for the same reason, we did not provide a BHAR figure in the
main text for targets of class actions linked to negative activism. We instead do
so below. Figure A4 shows buy-and-hold abnormal returns, repeating our buyand-hold analysis in Equation (1) of the main text. As the Figure shows, there
are meaningful drops not just at the time the suit is filed, but also during the days
leading up to the lawsuit. The leading drop may reflect some information leakage, but the bulk of it is likely due to the proximity between some negative activism events and subsequent class action lawsuits, which on occasion can be a
matter of just a few days.404

404. See, e.g., Complaint at 2, 7, Lagendyk et al. v. Rucker et al. (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2013) (No. 13-CV08160) (filing class action lawsuit on November 15, 2013, in response to negative activism report on November
14, 2013 about Tile Shop Holdings).
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FIGURE A4: BUY-AND-HOLD ABNORMAL RETURNS, FIRST
CLASS ACTION FILING
trading days from announcement
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To isolate the effect of class actions, Figure A5 presents BHAR for the
subset of forty class actions where the negative activism report occurred at least
thirty-one trading days405 prior to the class action. It shows a similar negative
impact of a class action’s filing on stock prices over the short- and long-term.

405. We chose a broader exclusionary window for our BHAR figure, because our BHAR presentation window begins thirty trading days before the class action’s initial filing, while our CAR presentation window begins
only ten trading days before.
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FIGURE A5 BUY-AND-HOLD ABNORMAL RETURNS, FIRST CLASS ACTION
FILING, SUBSET OF CLASS ACTIONS
trading days from announcement
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In the main text, we provide cumulative abnormal return estimates for the
first filing of a class action complaint. Table A3 below does the same for the
initial consolidated class-action’s filing. Some negative activism reports attracted an initial complaint and no related filings, in which case there was no
consolidated filing, and the event was excluded from Table A2. Additionally,
some companies had delisted between the filing of the initial complaint and consolidated complaint, so they were also excluded for missing data. As the Table
shows, consolidated class actions did not appear to evoke reliably statistically
significant stock price reactions. Since the filing of a consolidated class action
contains little new material information for investors, we would not expect a statistically significant stock price reaction to these events, making the findings reassuring.
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TABLE A2: CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS, FILING OF
CONSOLIDATED CLASS ACTION
Panel A: Fama-French Three Factor
Holding Period (in days)
[-1,1]
[-3,3]
Average
1.12%
1.73%
Median
1.56%
-0.31%
Standard Deviation
(0.90)
(1.50)
Events
62
62

[-10,1]
-1.11%
-1.61%
(1.57)
62

Panel B: Fama-French Four Factor
Holding Period (in days)
[-1,1]
[-3,3]
Average
0.99%
1.69%
Median
1.57%
-0.18%
Standard Deviation
(0.89)
(1.51)
Events
62
62

[-10,1]
-1.38%
-1.97%
(1.58)
62

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard
errors in parentheses.

